To control various access privileges in group-oriented applications having multiple data streams, we present a novel reactive key management scheme where each member can obtain the key of a data stream from public parameters only when necessary. Compared with the previous schemes, this scheme significantly reduces the amount of rekey messages for dynamic membership change due to its reactive nature.

In this study, a novel binary image authentication scheme is proposed, which can be used to detect any alteration of the host image. In the proposed scheme, the watermark is embedded into a host image using a Hamming-code-based embedding algorithm. A performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme achieves both smaller distortion and lower false negative rates than the previous schemes.

For the deployment of sensor networks, the sensor localization, which finds the position of sensor nodes, is very important. Most previous localization schemes generally use the GPS signal for the sensor localization. However, the GPS signal is unavailable when there is an obstacle between the sensor nodes and satellites. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new localization scheme which does not use the GPS signal. The proposed scheme localizes the sensors by using three mobile anchors. Because the three mobile anchors collaboratively move by themselves, it is self-localizable and can be adopted even when the sensors are randomly and sparsely deployed in the target field.

The security vulnerabilities of a number of provable secure proxy signature schemes are examined with the assumption that users can register their public keys without having corresponding private keys. This assumption is different from that of a standard proxy signature in which the public keys of users are authentic. Under this assumption, both the Triple Schnorr scheme and Kang et al's scheme are shown to be vulnerable to a rogue public key registration attack. This attack gives an adversary the ability to generate a proxy signature without the valid agreement of the original signer. Moreover, it is shown that an adversary can manipulate the description of a delegated signing right at will. This work can be considered as an awakening to the importance of Proof of Possession (PoP) in the PKI environment, as in many cases certificate authorities do not require the PoP protocol, as has been stated [1].