The PayWord Scheme, invented by Rivest and Shamir, is an efficient micropayment scheme utilizing a hash function. We point out that the scheme has the following problem: a malicious customer can damage the bank by purchasing in excess of the customer's credit which the bank has guaranteed by issuing a certificate. Generally, there are two positions of the bank with regard to the certificate. Position 1: the bank takes full responsibility for the certificate and compensates all payments created by the customer's purchases; and Position 2: the bank does not redeem payments exceeding a limit set for the customer and shares the loss with the shop if trouble occurs. In the PayWord Scheme, the bank can reduce its risk by adopting Position 2 rather than Position 1. However, this paper points out that the bank can damage the shop in Position 2 by impersonating an imaginary customer and making the shop share the loss with the bank. We propose a micropayment scheme (countermeasure) that overcomes these problems.