In this paper, we propose an RFID distance bounding protocol that uses m-ary challenges. Recently, Kim and Avoine proposed two distance bounding protocols with mixed challenges that are pre-determined or random. We generalize the first scheme of Kim and Avoine's random scheme as a distance bounding protocol with m-ary challenges. The generalized formula for success probabilities for mafia fraud and distance fraud attacks is derived. Our scheme using m-ary challenges reduces the mafia fraud success probability from (3/4)n for m=2 to (7/16)n for m=4 and the distance fraud success probability from $(1-rac 1 4 cdot P_r)^n$ for m=2 to $(1 - rac {189}{256} cdot P_r)^n$ for m=4, where Pr is the probability that a challenge is random.
Young-Sik KIM
Chosun University
Sang-Hyo KIM
Sungkyunkwan University
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Young-Sik KIM, Sang-Hyo KIM, "On the Use of m-Ary Challenges for RFID Distance Bounding Protocol" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications,
vol. E99-B, no. 9, pp. 2028-2035, September 2016, doi: 10.1587/transcom.2015EBP3389.
Abstract: In this paper, we propose an RFID distance bounding protocol that uses m-ary challenges. Recently, Kim and Avoine proposed two distance bounding protocols with mixed challenges that are pre-determined or random. We generalize the first scheme of Kim and Avoine's random scheme as a distance bounding protocol with m-ary challenges. The generalized formula for success probabilities for mafia fraud and distance fraud attacks is derived. Our scheme using m-ary challenges reduces the mafia fraud success probability from (3/4)n for m=2 to (7/16)n for m=4 and the distance fraud success probability from $(1-rac 1 4 cdot P_r)^n$ for m=2 to $(1 - rac {189}{256} cdot P_r)^n$ for m=4, where Pr is the probability that a challenge is random.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.2015EBP3389/_p
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@ARTICLE{e99-b_9_2028,
author={Young-Sik KIM, Sang-Hyo KIM, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={On the Use of m-Ary Challenges for RFID Distance Bounding Protocol},
year={2016},
volume={E99-B},
number={9},
pages={2028-2035},
abstract={In this paper, we propose an RFID distance bounding protocol that uses m-ary challenges. Recently, Kim and Avoine proposed two distance bounding protocols with mixed challenges that are pre-determined or random. We generalize the first scheme of Kim and Avoine's random scheme as a distance bounding protocol with m-ary challenges. The generalized formula for success probabilities for mafia fraud and distance fraud attacks is derived. Our scheme using m-ary challenges reduces the mafia fraud success probability from (3/4)n for m=2 to (7/16)n for m=4 and the distance fraud success probability from $(1-rac 1 4 cdot P_r)^n$ for m=2 to $(1 - rac {189}{256} cdot P_r)^n$ for m=4, where Pr is the probability that a challenge is random.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.2015EBP3389},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={September},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - On the Use of m-Ary Challenges for RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 2028
EP - 2035
AU - Young-Sik KIM
AU - Sang-Hyo KIM
PY - 2016
DO - 10.1587/transcom.2015EBP3389
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E99-B
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - September 2016
AB - In this paper, we propose an RFID distance bounding protocol that uses m-ary challenges. Recently, Kim and Avoine proposed two distance bounding protocols with mixed challenges that are pre-determined or random. We generalize the first scheme of Kim and Avoine's random scheme as a distance bounding protocol with m-ary challenges. The generalized formula for success probabilities for mafia fraud and distance fraud attacks is derived. Our scheme using m-ary challenges reduces the mafia fraud success probability from (3/4)n for m=2 to (7/16)n for m=4 and the distance fraud success probability from $(1-rac 1 4 cdot P_r)^n$ for m=2 to $(1 - rac {189}{256} cdot P_r)^n$ for m=4, where Pr is the probability that a challenge is random.
ER -