A Stackelberg Game Based Pricing and User Association for Spectrum Splitting Macro-Femto HetNets

Bo GU; Zhi LIU; Cheng ZHANG; Kyoko YAMORI; Osamu MIZUNO; Yoshiaki TANAKA

doi:10.1587/transcom.2017EBP3097

A Stackelberg Game Based Pricing and User Association for Spectrum Splitting Macro-Femto HetNets

Bo GU, Zhi LIU, Cheng ZHANG, Kyoko YAMORI, Osamu MIZUNO, Yoshiaki TANAKA

Full Text Views

0

Share
Cite this

Summary :

The demand for wireless traffic is increasing rapidly, which has posed huge challenges to mobile network operators (MNOs). A heterogeneous network (HetNet) framework, composed of a marcocell and femtocells, has been proved to be an effective way to cope with the fast-growing traffic demand. In this paper, we assume that both the macrocell and femtocells are owned by the same MNO, with revenue optimization as its ultimate goal. We aim to propose a pricing strategy for macro-femto HetNets with a user centric vision, namely, mobile users would have their own interest to make rational decisions on selecting between the macrocell and femtocells to maximize their individual benefit. We formulate a Stackelberg game to analyze the interactions between the MNO and users, and obtain the equilibrium solution for the Stackelberg game. Via extensive simulations, we evaluate the proposed pricing strategy in terms of its efficiency with respect to the revenue optimization.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications Vol.E101-B No.1 pp.154-162

Publication Date: 2018/01/01

Publicized: 2017/07/10

Online ISSN: 1745-1345

DOI: 10.1587/transcom.2017EBP3097

Type of Manuscript: PAPER

Category: Network

Authors

Bo GU
  Kogakuin University,Waseda University
Zhi LIU
  Waseda University,Shizuoka University
Cheng ZHANG
  Waseda University
Kyoko YAMORI
  Waseda University,Asahi University
Osamu MIZUNO
  Kogakuin University
Yoshiaki TANAKA
  Waseda University

Keyword

HetNet, macrocell, femtocell, user association, utility, pricing, revenue optimization, game

Cite this

Copy

Bo GU, Zhi LIU, Cheng ZHANG, Kyoko YAMORI, Osamu MIZUNO, Yoshiaki TANAKA, "A Stackelberg Game Based Pricing and User Association for Spectrum Splitting Macro-Femto HetNets" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications, vol. E101-B, no. 1, pp. 154-162, January 2018, doi: 10.1587/transcom.2017EBP3097.
Abstract: The demand for wireless traffic is increasing rapidly, which has posed huge challenges to mobile network operators (MNOs). A heterogeneous network (HetNet) framework, composed of a marcocell and femtocells, has been proved to be an effective way to cope with the fast-growing traffic demand. In this paper, we assume that both the macrocell and femtocells are owned by the same MNO, with revenue optimization as its ultimate goal. We aim to propose a pricing strategy for macro-femto HetNets with a user centric vision, namely, mobile users would have their own interest to make rational decisions on selecting between the macrocell and femtocells to maximize their individual benefit. We formulate a Stackelberg game to analyze the interactions between the MNO and users, and obtain the equilibrium solution for the Stackelberg game. Via extensive simulations, we evaluate the proposed pricing strategy in terms of its efficiency with respect to the revenue optimization.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.2017EBP3097/_p

Copy

@ARTICLE{e101-b_1_154,
author={Bo GU, Zhi LIU, Cheng ZHANG, Kyoko YAMORI, Osamu MIZUNO, Yoshiaki TANAKA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={A Stackelberg Game Based Pricing and User Association for Spectrum Splitting Macro-Femto HetNets},
year={2018},
volume={E101-B},
number={1},
pages={154-162},
abstract={The demand for wireless traffic is increasing rapidly, which has posed huge challenges to mobile network operators (MNOs). A heterogeneous network (HetNet) framework, composed of a marcocell and femtocells, has been proved to be an effective way to cope with the fast-growing traffic demand. In this paper, we assume that both the macrocell and femtocells are owned by the same MNO, with revenue optimization as its ultimate goal. We aim to propose a pricing strategy for macro-femto HetNets with a user centric vision, namely, mobile users would have their own interest to make rational decisions on selecting between the macrocell and femtocells to maximize their individual benefit. We formulate a Stackelberg game to analyze the interactions between the MNO and users, and obtain the equilibrium solution for the Stackelberg game. Via extensive simulations, we evaluate the proposed pricing strategy in terms of its efficiency with respect to the revenue optimization.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.2017EBP3097},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={January},}

Copy

TY - JOUR
TI - A Stackelberg Game Based Pricing and User Association for Spectrum Splitting Macro-Femto HetNets
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 154
EP - 162
AU - Bo GU
AU - Zhi LIU
AU - Cheng ZHANG
AU - Kyoko YAMORI
AU - Osamu MIZUNO
AU - Yoshiaki TANAKA
PY - 2018
DO - 10.1587/transcom.2017EBP3097
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E101-B
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - January 2018
AB - The demand for wireless traffic is increasing rapidly, which has posed huge challenges to mobile network operators (MNOs). A heterogeneous network (HetNet) framework, composed of a marcocell and femtocells, has been proved to be an effective way to cope with the fast-growing traffic demand. In this paper, we assume that both the macrocell and femtocells are owned by the same MNO, with revenue optimization as its ultimate goal. We aim to propose a pricing strategy for macro-femto HetNets with a user centric vision, namely, mobile users would have their own interest to make rational decisions on selecting between the macrocell and femtocells to maximize their individual benefit. We formulate a Stackelberg game to analyze the interactions between the MNO and users, and obtain the equilibrium solution for the Stackelberg game. Via extensive simulations, we evaluate the proposed pricing strategy in terms of its efficiency with respect to the revenue optimization.
ER -