A Game Theoretic Framework for Bandwidth Allocation and Pricing in Federated Wireless Networks

Bo GU; Kyoko YAMORI; Sugang XU; Yoshiaki TANAKA

doi:10.1587/transcom.E95.B.1109

A Game Theoretic Framework for Bandwidth Allocation and Pricing in Federated Wireless Networks

Bo GU, Kyoko YAMORI, Sugang XU, Yoshiaki TANAKA

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With the proliferation of IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks, large numbers of wireless access points have been deployed, and it is often the case that a user can detect several access points simultaneously in dense metropolitan areas. Most owners, however, encrypt their networks to prevent the public from accessing them due to the increased traffic and security risk. In this work, we use pricing as an incentive mechanism to motivate the owners to share their networks with the public, while at the same time satisfying users' service demand. Specifically, we propose a “federated network” concept, in which radio resources of various wireless local area networks are managed together. Our algorithm identifies two candidate access points with the lowest price being offered (if available) to each user. We then model the price announcements of access points as a game, and characterize the Nash Equilibrium of the system. The efficiency of the Nash Equilibrium solution is evaluated via simulation studies as well.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications Vol.E95-B No.4 pp.1109-1116

Publication Date: 2012/04/01

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Online ISSN: 1745-1345

DOI: 10.1587/transcom.E95.B.1109

Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cognitive Radio and Heterogeneous Wireless Networks in Conjunction with Main Topics of CrownCom2011)

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Bo GU, Kyoko YAMORI, Sugang XU, Yoshiaki TANAKA, "A Game Theoretic Framework for Bandwidth Allocation and Pricing in Federated Wireless Networks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications, vol. E95-B, no. 4, pp. 1109-1116, April 2012, doi: 10.1587/transcom.E95.B.1109.
Abstract: With the proliferation of IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks, large numbers of wireless access points have been deployed, and it is often the case that a user can detect several access points simultaneously in dense metropolitan areas. Most owners, however, encrypt their networks to prevent the public from accessing them due to the increased traffic and security risk. In this work, we use pricing as an incentive mechanism to motivate the owners to share their networks with the public, while at the same time satisfying users' service demand. Specifically, we propose a “federated network” concept, in which radio resources of various wireless local area networks are managed together. Our algorithm identifies two candidate access points with the lowest price being offered (if available) to each user. We then model the price announcements of access points as a game, and characterize the Nash Equilibrium of the system. The efficiency of the Nash Equilibrium solution is evaluated via simulation studies as well.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.E95.B.1109/_p

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@ARTICLE{e95-b_4_1109,
author={Bo GU, Kyoko YAMORI, Sugang XU, Yoshiaki TANAKA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={A Game Theoretic Framework for Bandwidth Allocation and Pricing in Federated Wireless Networks},
year={2012},
volume={E95-B},
number={4},
pages={1109-1116},
abstract={With the proliferation of IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks, large numbers of wireless access points have been deployed, and it is often the case that a user can detect several access points simultaneously in dense metropolitan areas. Most owners, however, encrypt their networks to prevent the public from accessing them due to the increased traffic and security risk. In this work, we use pricing as an incentive mechanism to motivate the owners to share their networks with the public, while at the same time satisfying users' service demand. Specifically, we propose a “federated network” concept, in which radio resources of various wireless local area networks are managed together. Our algorithm identifies two candidate access points with the lowest price being offered (if available) to each user. We then model the price announcements of access points as a game, and characterize the Nash Equilibrium of the system. The efficiency of the Nash Equilibrium solution is evaluated via simulation studies as well.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.E95.B.1109},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={April},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - A Game Theoretic Framework for Bandwidth Allocation and Pricing in Federated Wireless Networks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 1109
EP - 1116
AU - Bo GU
AU - Kyoko YAMORI
AU - Sugang XU
AU - Yoshiaki TANAKA
PY - 2012
DO - 10.1587/transcom.E95.B.1109
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E95-B
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - April 2012
AB - With the proliferation of IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks, large numbers of wireless access points have been deployed, and it is often the case that a user can detect several access points simultaneously in dense metropolitan areas. Most owners, however, encrypt their networks to prevent the public from accessing them due to the increased traffic and security risk. In this work, we use pricing as an incentive mechanism to motivate the owners to share their networks with the public, while at the same time satisfying users' service demand. Specifically, we propose a “federated network” concept, in which radio resources of various wireless local area networks are managed together. Our algorithm identifies two candidate access points with the lowest price being offered (if available) to each user. We then model the price announcements of access points as a game, and characterize the Nash Equilibrium of the system. The efficiency of the Nash Equilibrium solution is evaluated via simulation studies as well.
ER -