Pricing-Based Dynamic Spectrum Leasing: A Hierarchical Multi-Stage Stackelberg Game Perspective

Chungang YANG; Jiandong LI

doi:10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1511

Pricing-Based Dynamic Spectrum Leasing: A Hierarchical Multi-Stage Stackelberg Game Perspective

Chungang YANG, Jiandong LI

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Dynamic spectrum leasing (DSL) is regarded as a promising dynamic spectrum sharing (DSS) scheme both to improve the spectrum revenue of primary users (PUs) and to guarantee the QoS of secondary users (SUs). A pricing-based DSL termed PBDSL is formulated as a Stackelberg DSL game model, where PUs as players entering the interacting game with multiple SUs. The strategic design contains both optimal spectrum pricing schemes (including unit spectrum/interference price and interference sensitivity distributed adjustments) of PUs for the specific shared/leased spectrum and optimal transmission strategies (e.g., transmit power and bandwidth) of SUs. To capture two types of competition relationships among multiple SUs and between SUs and PUs, we investigate two intra-game models of multiple PUs and SUs, respectively, which interact with each other to constitute the final Stackelberg DSL game. The existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium solution (SES) are analyzed and proved for presented games, based on which a joint multi-stage PBDSL algorithm is presented to approximate the optimal equilibrium strategies. Numerical results demonstrate the convergence property of the interactive decision-making process, and verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, in a comparison with the Nash equilibrium solution (NES)-based approach.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications Vol.E96-B No.6 pp.1511-1521

Publication Date: 2013/06/01

Publicized

Online ISSN: 1745-1345

DOI: 10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1511

Type of Manuscript: PAPER

Category: Wireless Communication Technologies

Authors

Chungang YANG
Xidian University
Jiandong LI
Xidian University

Keyword

cognitive radio network, dynamic spectrum leasing, Stackelberg equilibrium, power control

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Chungang YANG, Jiandong LI, "Pricing-Based Dynamic Spectrum Leasing: A Hierarchical Multi-Stage Stackelberg Game Perspective" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications, vol. E96-B, no. 6, pp. 1511-1521, June 2013, doi: 10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1511.
Abstract: Dynamic spectrum leasing (DSL) is regarded as a promising dynamic spectrum sharing (DSS) scheme both to improve the spectrum revenue of primary users (PUs) and to guarantee the QoS of secondary users (SUs). A pricing-based DSL termed PBDSL is formulated as a Stackelberg DSL game model, where PUs as players entering the interacting game with multiple SUs. The strategic design contains both optimal spectrum pricing schemes (including unit spectrum/interference price and interference sensitivity distributed adjustments) of PUs for the specific shared/leased spectrum and optimal transmission strategies (e.g., transmit power and bandwidth) of SUs. To capture two types of competition relationships among multiple SUs and between SUs and PUs, we investigate two intra-game models of multiple PUs and SUs, respectively, which interact with each other to constitute the final Stackelberg DSL game. The existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium solution (SES) are analyzed and proved for presented games, based on which a joint multi-stage PBDSL algorithm is presented to approximate the optimal equilibrium strategies. Numerical results demonstrate the convergence property of the interactive decision-making process, and verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, in a comparison with the Nash equilibrium solution (NES)-based approach.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1511/_p

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@ARTICLE{e96-b_6_1511,
author={Chungang YANG, Jiandong LI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={Pricing-Based Dynamic Spectrum Leasing: A Hierarchical Multi-Stage Stackelberg Game Perspective},
year={2013},
volume={E96-B},
number={6},
pages={1511-1521},
abstract={Dynamic spectrum leasing (DSL) is regarded as a promising dynamic spectrum sharing (DSS) scheme both to improve the spectrum revenue of primary users (PUs) and to guarantee the QoS of secondary users (SUs). A pricing-based DSL termed PBDSL is formulated as a Stackelberg DSL game model, where PUs as players entering the interacting game with multiple SUs. The strategic design contains both optimal spectrum pricing schemes (including unit spectrum/interference price and interference sensitivity distributed adjustments) of PUs for the specific shared/leased spectrum and optimal transmission strategies (e.g., transmit power and bandwidth) of SUs. To capture two types of competition relationships among multiple SUs and between SUs and PUs, we investigate two intra-game models of multiple PUs and SUs, respectively, which interact with each other to constitute the final Stackelberg DSL game. The existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium solution (SES) are analyzed and proved for presented games, based on which a joint multi-stage PBDSL algorithm is presented to approximate the optimal equilibrium strategies. Numerical results demonstrate the convergence property of the interactive decision-making process, and verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, in a comparison with the Nash equilibrium solution (NES)-based approach.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1511},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={June},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Pricing-Based Dynamic Spectrum Leasing: A Hierarchical Multi-Stage Stackelberg Game Perspective
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 1511
EP - 1521
AU - Chungang YANG
AU - Jiandong LI
PY - 2013
DO - 10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1511
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E96-B
IS - 6
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - June 2013
AB - Dynamic spectrum leasing (DSL) is regarded as a promising dynamic spectrum sharing (DSS) scheme both to improve the spectrum revenue of primary users (PUs) and to guarantee the QoS of secondary users (SUs). A pricing-based DSL termed PBDSL is formulated as a Stackelberg DSL game model, where PUs as players entering the interacting game with multiple SUs. The strategic design contains both optimal spectrum pricing schemes (including unit spectrum/interference price and interference sensitivity distributed adjustments) of PUs for the specific shared/leased spectrum and optimal transmission strategies (e.g., transmit power and bandwidth) of SUs. To capture two types of competition relationships among multiple SUs and between SUs and PUs, we investigate two intra-game models of multiple PUs and SUs, respectively, which interact with each other to constitute the final Stackelberg DSL game. The existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium solution (SES) are analyzed and proved for presented games, based on which a joint multi-stage PBDSL algorithm is presented to approximate the optimal equilibrium strategies. Numerical results demonstrate the convergence property of the interactive decision-making process, and verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, in a comparison with the Nash equilibrium solution (NES)-based approach.
ER -