Two-Level Bargaining Game Modeling for Cooperation Stimulation in Spectrum Leasing

Biling ZHANG; Kai CHEN; Jung-lang YU; Shiduan CHENG

doi:10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1953

Two-Level Bargaining Game Modeling for Cooperation Stimulation in Spectrum Leasing

Biling ZHANG, Kai CHEN, Jung-lang YU, Shiduan CHENG

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In cognitive radio networks, the primary user (PU) can lease a fraction of its licensed spectrum to the secondary users (SUs) in exchange for their cooperative transmission if it has a minimum transmission rate requirement and is experiencing a bad channel condition. However, due to the selfish nature of the SUs, they may not cooperate to meet the PU's Quality of Service (QoS) requirement. On the other hand, the SUs may not exploit efficiently the benefit from cooperation if they compete with each other and collaborate with the PU independently. Therefore, when SUs belong to the same organization and can work as a group, how to stimulate them to cooperate with the PU and thus guarantee the PU's QoS requirement, and how to coordinate the usage of rewarded spectrum among these SUs after cooperation are critical challenges. In this paper, we propose a two-level bargaining framework to address the aforementioned problems. In the proposed framework, the interactions between the PU and the SUs are modeled as the upper level bargaining game while the lower level bargaining game is used to formulate the SUs' decision making process on spectrum sharing. We analyze the optimal actions of the users and derive the theoretic results for the one-PU one-SU scenario. To find the solutions for the one-PU multi-SU scenario, we put forward a revised numerical searching algorithm and prove its convergence. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme through simulations.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications Vol.E96-B No.7 pp.1953-1961

Publication Date: 2013/07/01

Publicized

Online ISSN: 1745-1345

DOI: 10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1953

Type of Manuscript: PAPER

Category: Wireless Communication Technologies

Authors

Biling ZHANG
  Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (BUPT)
Kai CHEN
  BUPT
Jung-lang YU
  Fu Jen Catholic University
Shiduan CHENG
  BUPT

Keyword

cognitive radio, spectrum leasing, cooperative game theory, Nash Bargaining Solution, cooperative transmission

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Biling ZHANG, Kai CHEN, Jung-lang YU, Shiduan CHENG, "Two-Level Bargaining Game Modeling for Cooperation Stimulation in Spectrum Leasing" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications, vol. E96-B, no. 7, pp. 1953-1961, July 2013, doi: 10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1953.
Abstract: In cognitive radio networks, the primary user (PU) can lease a fraction of its licensed spectrum to the secondary users (SUs) in exchange for their cooperative transmission if it has a minimum transmission rate requirement and is experiencing a bad channel condition. However, due to the selfish nature of the SUs, they may not cooperate to meet the PU's Quality of Service (QoS) requirement. On the other hand, the SUs may not exploit efficiently the benefit from cooperation if they compete with each other and collaborate with the PU independently. Therefore, when SUs belong to the same organization and can work as a group, how to stimulate them to cooperate with the PU and thus guarantee the PU's QoS requirement, and how to coordinate the usage of rewarded spectrum among these SUs after cooperation are critical challenges. In this paper, we propose a two-level bargaining framework to address the aforementioned problems. In the proposed framework, the interactions between the PU and the SUs are modeled as the upper level bargaining game while the lower level bargaining game is used to formulate the SUs' decision making process on spectrum sharing. We analyze the optimal actions of the users and derive the theoretic results for the one-PU one-SU scenario. To find the solutions for the one-PU multi-SU scenario, we put forward a revised numerical searching algorithm and prove its convergence. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme through simulations.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1953/_p

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@ARTICLE{e96-b_7_1953,
author={Biling ZHANG, Kai CHEN, Jung-lang YU, Shiduan CHENG, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={Two-Level Bargaining Game Modeling for Cooperation Stimulation in Spectrum Leasing},
year={2013},
volume={E96-B},
number={7},
pages={1953-1961},
abstract={In cognitive radio networks, the primary user (PU) can lease a fraction of its licensed spectrum to the secondary users (SUs) in exchange for their cooperative transmission if it has a minimum transmission rate requirement and is experiencing a bad channel condition. However, due to the selfish nature of the SUs, they may not cooperate to meet the PU's Quality of Service (QoS) requirement. On the other hand, the SUs may not exploit efficiently the benefit from cooperation if they compete with each other and collaborate with the PU independently. Therefore, when SUs belong to the same organization and can work as a group, how to stimulate them to cooperate with the PU and thus guarantee the PU's QoS requirement, and how to coordinate the usage of rewarded spectrum among these SUs after cooperation are critical challenges. In this paper, we propose a two-level bargaining framework to address the aforementioned problems. In the proposed framework, the interactions between the PU and the SUs are modeled as the upper level bargaining game while the lower level bargaining game is used to formulate the SUs' decision making process on spectrum sharing. We analyze the optimal actions of the users and derive the theoretic results for the one-PU one-SU scenario. To find the solutions for the one-PU multi-SU scenario, we put forward a revised numerical searching algorithm and prove its convergence. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme through simulations.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1953},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={July},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Two-Level Bargaining Game Modeling for Cooperation Stimulation in Spectrum Leasing
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 1953
EP - 1961
AU - Biling ZHANG
AU - Kai CHEN
AU - Jung-lang YU
AU - Shiduan CHENG
PY - 2013
DO - 10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1953
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E96-B
IS - 7
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - July 2013
AB - In cognitive radio networks, the primary user (PU) can lease a fraction of its licensed spectrum to the secondary users (SUs) in exchange for their cooperative transmission if it has a minimum transmission rate requirement and is experiencing a bad channel condition. However, due to the selfish nature of the SUs, they may not cooperate to meet the PU's Quality of Service (QoS) requirement. On the other hand, the SUs may not exploit efficiently the benefit from cooperation if they compete with each other and collaborate with the PU independently. Therefore, when SUs belong to the same organization and can work as a group, how to stimulate them to cooperate with the PU and thus guarantee the PU's QoS requirement, and how to coordinate the usage of rewarded spectrum among these SUs after cooperation are critical challenges. In this paper, we propose a two-level bargaining framework to address the aforementioned problems. In the proposed framework, the interactions between the PU and the SUs are modeled as the upper level bargaining game while the lower level bargaining game is used to formulate the SUs' decision making process on spectrum sharing. We analyze the optimal actions of the users and derive the theoretic results for the one-PU one-SU scenario. To find the solutions for the one-PU multi-SU scenario, we put forward a revised numerical searching algorithm and prove its convergence. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme through simulations.
ER -