Multi-Stage Non-cooperative Game for Pricing and Connection Admission Control in Wireless Local Area Networks

Bo GU; Kyoko YAMORI; Sugang XU; Yoshiaki TANAKA

doi:10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1986

Multi-Stage Non-cooperative Game for Pricing and Connection Admission Control in Wireless Local Area Networks

Bo GU, Kyoko YAMORI, Sugang XU, Yoshiaki TANAKA

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This paper focuses on learning the economic behaviour of the access point (AP) and users in wireless local area networks (WLANs), and using a game theoretic approach to analyze the interactions among them. Recent studies have shown that the AP would adopt a simple, yet optimal, fixed rate pricing strategy when the AP has an unlimited uplink bandwidth to the Internet and the channel capacity of WLAN is unlimited. However, the fixed rate strategy fails to be optimal if a more realistic model with limited capacity is considered. A substitute pricing scheme for access service provisioning is hence proposed. In particular, the AP first estimates the probable utility degradation of existing users consequent upon the admission of an incoming user. Second, the AP decides: (i) whether the incoming user should be accepted; and (ii) the price to be announced in order to try to maximize the overall revenue. The condition, under which the proposed scheme results in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), is investigated.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications Vol.E96-B No.7 pp.1986-1996

Publication Date: 2013/07/01

Publicized

Online ISSN: 1745-1345

DOI: 10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1986

Type of Manuscript: PAPER

Category: Terrestrial Wireless Communication/Broadcasting Technologies

Authors

Bo GU
  Waseda University
Kyoko YAMORI
  Waseda University,Asahi University
Sugang XU
  Waseda University
Yoshiaki TANAKA
  Waseda University

Keyword

connection admission control, pricing, game theory, equilibrium, PBE

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Bo GU, Kyoko YAMORI, Sugang XU, Yoshiaki TANAKA, "Multi-Stage Non-cooperative Game for Pricing and Connection Admission Control in Wireless Local Area Networks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications, vol. E96-B, no. 7, pp. 1986-1996, July 2013, doi: 10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1986.
Abstract: This paper focuses on learning the economic behaviour of the access point (AP) and users in wireless local area networks (WLANs), and using a game theoretic approach to analyze the interactions among them. Recent studies have shown that the AP would adopt a simple, yet optimal, fixed rate pricing strategy when the AP has an unlimited uplink bandwidth to the Internet and the channel capacity of WLAN is unlimited. However, the fixed rate strategy fails to be optimal if a more realistic model with limited capacity is considered. A substitute pricing scheme for access service provisioning is hence proposed. In particular, the AP first estimates the probable utility degradation of existing users consequent upon the admission of an incoming user. Second, the AP decides: (i) whether the incoming user should be accepted; and (ii) the price to be announced in order to try to maximize the overall revenue. The condition, under which the proposed scheme results in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), is investigated.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1986/_p

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@ARTICLE{e96-b_7_1986,
author={Bo GU, Kyoko YAMORI, Sugang XU, Yoshiaki TANAKA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={Multi-Stage Non-cooperative Game for Pricing and Connection Admission Control in Wireless Local Area Networks},
year={2013},
volume={E96-B},
number={7},
pages={1986-1996},
abstract={This paper focuses on learning the economic behaviour of the access point (AP) and users in wireless local area networks (WLANs), and using a game theoretic approach to analyze the interactions among them. Recent studies have shown that the AP would adopt a simple, yet optimal, fixed rate pricing strategy when the AP has an unlimited uplink bandwidth to the Internet and the channel capacity of WLAN is unlimited. However, the fixed rate strategy fails to be optimal if a more realistic model with limited capacity is considered. A substitute pricing scheme for access service provisioning is hence proposed. In particular, the AP first estimates the probable utility degradation of existing users consequent upon the admission of an incoming user. Second, the AP decides: (i) whether the incoming user should be accepted; and (ii) the price to be announced in order to try to maximize the overall revenue. The condition, under which the proposed scheme results in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), is investigated.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1986},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={July},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Multi-Stage Non-cooperative Game for Pricing and Connection Admission Control in Wireless Local Area Networks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 1986
EP - 1996
AU - Bo GU
AU - Kyoko YAMORI
AU - Sugang XU
AU - Yoshiaki TANAKA
PY - 2013
DO - 10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1986
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E96-B
IS - 7
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - July 2013
AB - This paper focuses on learning the economic behaviour of the access point (AP) and users in wireless local area networks (WLANs), and using a game theoretic approach to analyze the interactions among them. Recent studies have shown that the AP would adopt a simple, yet optimal, fixed rate pricing strategy when the AP has an unlimited uplink bandwidth to the Internet and the channel capacity of WLAN is unlimited. However, the fixed rate strategy fails to be optimal if a more realistic model with limited capacity is considered. A substitute pricing scheme for access service provisioning is hence proposed. In particular, the AP first estimates the probable utility degradation of existing users consequent upon the admission of an incoming user. Second, the AP decides: (i) whether the incoming user should be accepted; and (ii) the price to be announced in order to try to maximize the overall revenue. The condition, under which the proposed scheme results in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), is investigated.
ER -