Network Adversary Attacks against Secure Encryption Schemes

Virgil D. GLIGOR; Bryan PARNO; Ji Sun SHIN

doi:10.1587/transcom.E98.B.267

Network Adversary Attacks against Secure Encryption Schemes

Virgil D. GLIGOR, Bryan PARNO, Ji Sun SHIN

Full Text Views

0

Share
Cite this

Summary :

We show that, in practice, a network adversary can achieve decidedly non-negligible advantage in attacking provable key-protection properties; e.g., the “existential key recovery” security and “multi-key hiding” property of typical nonce-based symmetric encryption schemes whenever these schemes are implemented with standard block ciphers. We also show that if a probabilistic encryption scheme uses certain standard block ciphers (e.g., two-key 3DES), then enforcing the security bounds necessary to protect against network adversary attacks will render the scheme impractical for network applications that share group keys amongst many peers. The attacks presented here have three noteworthy implications. First, they help identify key-protection properties that separate the notion of indistinguishability from random bits (IND$) from the strictly weaker notion of indistinguishability of ciphertexts (IND); also, they help establish new relationships among these properties. Second, they show that nonce-based symmetric encryption schemes are typically weaker than probabilistic ones. Third, they illustrate the need to account for the Internet-level growth of adversary capabilities when establishing the useful lifetime of standard block-cipher parameters.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications Vol.E98-B No.2 pp.267-279

Publication Date: 2015/02/01

Publicized

Online ISSN: 1745-1345

DOI: 10.1587/transcom.E98.B.267

Type of Manuscript: PAPER

Category: Fundamental Theories for Communications

Authors

Virgil D. GLIGOR
  Carnegie Mellon University
Bryan PARNO
  Microsoft Research
Ji Sun SHIN
  Sejong University

Keyword

network adversary attacks, symmetric encryption schemes, key-protection properties, block ciphers

Cite this

Copy

Virgil D. GLIGOR, Bryan PARNO, Ji Sun SHIN, "Network Adversary Attacks against Secure Encryption Schemes" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications, vol. E98-B, no. 2, pp. 267-279, February 2015, doi: 10.1587/transcom.E98.B.267.
Abstract: We show that, in practice, a network adversary can achieve decidedly non-negligible advantage in attacking provable key-protection properties; e.g., the “existential key recovery” security and “multi-key hiding” property of typical nonce-based symmetric encryption schemes whenever these schemes are implemented with standard block ciphers. We also show that if a probabilistic encryption scheme uses certain standard block ciphers (e.g., two-key 3DES), then enforcing the security bounds necessary to protect against network adversary attacks will render the scheme impractical for network applications that share group keys amongst many peers. The attacks presented here have three noteworthy implications. First, they help identify key-protection properties that separate the notion of indistinguishability from random bits (IND$) from the strictly weaker notion of indistinguishability of ciphertexts (IND); also, they help establish new relationships among these properties. Second, they show that nonce-based symmetric encryption schemes are typically weaker than probabilistic ones. Third, they illustrate the need to account for the Internet-level growth of adversary capabilities when establishing the useful lifetime of standard block-cipher parameters.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/communications/10.1587/transcom.E98.B.267/_p

Copy

@ARTICLE{e98-b_2_267,
author={Virgil D. GLIGOR, Bryan PARNO, Ji Sun SHIN, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications},
title={Network Adversary Attacks against Secure Encryption Schemes},
year={2015},
volume={E98-B},
number={2},
pages={267-279},
abstract={We show that, in practice, a network adversary can achieve decidedly non-negligible advantage in attacking provable key-protection properties; e.g., the “existential key recovery” security and “multi-key hiding” property of typical nonce-based symmetric encryption schemes whenever these schemes are implemented with standard block ciphers. We also show that if a probabilistic encryption scheme uses certain standard block ciphers (e.g., two-key 3DES), then enforcing the security bounds necessary to protect against network adversary attacks will render the scheme impractical for network applications that share group keys amongst many peers. The attacks presented here have three noteworthy implications. First, they help identify key-protection properties that separate the notion of indistinguishability from random bits (IND$) from the strictly weaker notion of indistinguishability of ciphertexts (IND); also, they help establish new relationships among these properties. Second, they show that nonce-based symmetric encryption schemes are typically weaker than probabilistic ones. Third, they illustrate the need to account for the Internet-level growth of adversary capabilities when establishing the useful lifetime of standard block-cipher parameters.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transcom.E98.B.267},
ISSN={1745-1345},
month={February},}

Copy

TY - JOUR
TI - Network Adversary Attacks against Secure Encryption Schemes
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SP - 267
EP - 279
AU - Virgil D. GLIGOR
AU - Bryan PARNO
AU - Ji Sun SHIN
PY - 2015
DO - 10.1587/transcom.E98.B.267
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
SN - 1745-1345
VL - E98-B
IS - 2
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Y1 - February 2015
AB - We show that, in practice, a network adversary can achieve decidedly non-negligible advantage in attacking provable key-protection properties; e.g., the “existential key recovery” security and “multi-key hiding” property of typical nonce-based symmetric encryption schemes whenever these schemes are implemented with standard block ciphers. We also show that if a probabilistic encryption scheme uses certain standard block ciphers (e.g., two-key 3DES), then enforcing the security bounds necessary to protect against network adversary attacks will render the scheme impractical for network applications that share group keys amongst many peers. The attacks presented here have three noteworthy implications. First, they help identify key-protection properties that separate the notion of indistinguishability from random bits (IND$) from the strictly weaker notion of indistinguishability of ciphertexts (IND); also, they help establish new relationships among these properties. Second, they show that nonce-based symmetric encryption schemes are typically weaker than probabilistic ones. Third, they illustrate the need to account for the Internet-level growth of adversary capabilities when establishing the useful lifetime of standard block-cipher parameters.
ER -