In this paper, we analyse the signcryption scheme proposed by Libert and Quisquater in 2004 and show that their scheme does not meet the requirements as claimed in their paper in PKC'2004, such as, semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphtertext attack, ciphertext anonymity and key invisibility.
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Chik-How TAN, "On the Security of Signcryption Scheme with Key Privacy" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E88-A, no. 4, pp. 1093-1095, April 2005, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.4.1093.
Abstract: In this paper, we analyse the signcryption scheme proposed by Libert and Quisquater in 2004 and show that their scheme does not meet the requirements as claimed in their paper in PKC'2004, such as, semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphtertext attack, ciphertext anonymity and key invisibility.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.4.1093/_p
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@ARTICLE{e88-a_4_1093,
author={Chik-How TAN, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={On the Security of Signcryption Scheme with Key Privacy},
year={2005},
volume={E88-A},
number={4},
pages={1093-1095},
abstract={In this paper, we analyse the signcryption scheme proposed by Libert and Quisquater in 2004 and show that their scheme does not meet the requirements as claimed in their paper in PKC'2004, such as, semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphtertext attack, ciphertext anonymity and key invisibility.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.4.1093},
ISSN={},
month={April},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - On the Security of Signcryption Scheme with Key Privacy
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1093
EP - 1095
AU - Chik-How TAN
PY - 2005
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.4.1093
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E88-A
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - April 2005
AB - In this paper, we analyse the signcryption scheme proposed by Libert and Quisquater in 2004 and show that their scheme does not meet the requirements as claimed in their paper in PKC'2004, such as, semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphtertext attack, ciphertext anonymity and key invisibility.
ER -