Security Analysis of Signcryption Scheme from <I>q</I>-Diffie-Hellman Problems

Chik-How TAN

doi:10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.1.206

Security Analysis of Signcryption Scheme from q-Diffie-Hellman Problems

Chik-How TAN

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In this paper, we analyse the Libert-Quisquater's q-DH signcryption scheme proposed in SCN'2004. Although the paper proved that their scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model, we disprove their claim and show that their scheme is not even secure against non-adaptive chosen ciphtertext attacks, which is the weaker security than the adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. We further show that the semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme defined in their paper is not sufficient to guarantee their signcryption scheme to be secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E89-A No.1 pp.206-208

Publication Date: 2006/01/01

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Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.1.206

Type of Manuscript: Special Section LETTER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)

Category: Public Key Cryptography

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Chik-How TAN, "Security Analysis of Signcryption Scheme from q-Diffie-Hellman Problems" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E89-A, no. 1, pp. 206-208, January 2006, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.1.206.
Abstract: In this paper, we analyse the Libert-Quisquater's q-DH signcryption scheme proposed in SCN'2004. Although the paper proved that their scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model, we disprove their claim and show that their scheme is not even secure against non-adaptive chosen ciphtertext attacks, which is the weaker security than the adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. We further show that the semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme defined in their paper is not sufficient to guarantee their signcryption scheme to be secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.1.206/_p

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@ARTICLE{e89-a_1_206,
author={Chik-How TAN, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Security Analysis of Signcryption Scheme from q-Diffie-Hellman Problems},
year={2006},
volume={E89-A},
number={1},
pages={206-208},
abstract={In this paper, we analyse the Libert-Quisquater's q-DH signcryption scheme proposed in SCN'2004. Although the paper proved that their scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model, we disprove their claim and show that their scheme is not even secure against non-adaptive chosen ciphtertext attacks, which is the weaker security than the adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. We further show that the semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme defined in their paper is not sufficient to guarantee their signcryption scheme to be secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.1.206},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Security Analysis of Signcryption Scheme from q-Diffie-Hellman Problems
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 206
EP - 208
AU - Chik-How TAN
PY - 2006
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.1.206
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E89-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2006
AB - In this paper, we analyse the Libert-Quisquater's q-DH signcryption scheme proposed in SCN'2004. Although the paper proved that their scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model, we disprove their claim and show that their scheme is not even secure against non-adaptive chosen ciphtertext attacks, which is the weaker security than the adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. We further show that the semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme defined in their paper is not sufficient to guarantee their signcryption scheme to be secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
ER -