An Efficient and Leakage-Resilient RSA-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with Tight Security Reduction

SeongHan SHIN; Kazukuni KOBARA; Hideki IMAI

doi:10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.2.474

An Efficient and Leakage-Resilient RSA-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with Tight Security Reduction

SeongHan SHIN, Kazukuni KOBARA, Hideki IMAI

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Both mutual authentication and generation of session keys can be accomplished by an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol. Let us consider the following situation: (1) a client, who communicates with many different servers, remembers only one password and has insecure devices (e.g., mobile phones or PDAs) with very-restricted computing power and built-in memory capacity; (2) the counterpart servers have enormous computing power, but they are not perfectly secure against various attacks (e.g., virus or hackers); (3) neither PKI (Public Key Infrastructures) nor TRM (Tamper-Resistant Modules) is available. The main goal of this paper is to provide security against the leakage of stored secrets as well as to attain high efficiency on client's side. For those, we propose an efficient and leakage-resilient RSA-based AKE (RSA-AKE) protocol suitable for the above situation whose authenticity is based on password and another secret. In the extended model where an adversary is given access to the stored secret of client, we prove that its security of the RSA-AKE protocol is reduced tightly to the RSA one-wayness in the random oracle model. We also show that the RSA-AKE protocol guarantees several security properties (e.g., security of password, multiple sever scenario with only one password, perfect forward secrecy and anonymity). To our best knowledge, the RSA-AKE protocol is the most efficient, in terms of both computation costs of client and communication costs, over the previous AKE protocols of their kind (using password and RSA).

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E90-A No.2 pp.474-490

Publication Date: 2007/02/01

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Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.2.474

Type of Manuscript: PAPER

Category: Information Security

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SeongHan SHIN, Kazukuni KOBARA, Hideki IMAI, "An Efficient and Leakage-Resilient RSA-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with Tight Security Reduction" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E90-A, no. 2, pp. 474-490, February 2007, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.2.474.
Abstract: Both mutual authentication and generation of session keys can be accomplished by an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol. Let us consider the following situation: (1) a client, who communicates with many different servers, remembers only one password and has insecure devices (e.g., mobile phones or PDAs) with very-restricted computing power and built-in memory capacity; (2) the counterpart servers have enormous computing power, but they are not perfectly secure against various attacks (e.g., virus or hackers); (3) neither PKI (Public Key Infrastructures) nor TRM (Tamper-Resistant Modules) is available. The main goal of this paper is to provide security against the leakage of stored secrets as well as to attain high efficiency on client's side. For those, we propose an efficient and leakage-resilient RSA-based AKE (RSA-AKE) protocol suitable for the above situation whose authenticity is based on password and another secret. In the extended model where an adversary is given access to the stored secret of client, we prove that its security of the RSA-AKE protocol is reduced tightly to the RSA one-wayness in the random oracle model. We also show that the RSA-AKE protocol guarantees several security properties (e.g., security of password, multiple sever scenario with only one password, perfect forward secrecy and anonymity). To our best knowledge, the RSA-AKE protocol is the most efficient, in terms of both computation costs of client and communication costs, over the previous AKE protocols of their kind (using password and RSA).
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.2.474/_p

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@ARTICLE{e90-a_2_474,
author={SeongHan SHIN, Kazukuni KOBARA, Hideki IMAI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={An Efficient and Leakage-Resilient RSA-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with Tight Security Reduction},
year={2007},
volume={E90-A},
number={2},
pages={474-490},
abstract={Both mutual authentication and generation of session keys can be accomplished by an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol. Let us consider the following situation: (1) a client, who communicates with many different servers, remembers only one password and has insecure devices (e.g., mobile phones or PDAs) with very-restricted computing power and built-in memory capacity; (2) the counterpart servers have enormous computing power, but they are not perfectly secure against various attacks (e.g., virus or hackers); (3) neither PKI (Public Key Infrastructures) nor TRM (Tamper-Resistant Modules) is available. The main goal of this paper is to provide security against the leakage of stored secrets as well as to attain high efficiency on client's side. For those, we propose an efficient and leakage-resilient RSA-based AKE (RSA-AKE) protocol suitable for the above situation whose authenticity is based on password and another secret. In the extended model where an adversary is given access to the stored secret of client, we prove that its security of the RSA-AKE protocol is reduced tightly to the RSA one-wayness in the random oracle model. We also show that the RSA-AKE protocol guarantees several security properties (e.g., security of password, multiple sever scenario with only one password, perfect forward secrecy and anonymity). To our best knowledge, the RSA-AKE protocol is the most efficient, in terms of both computation costs of client and communication costs, over the previous AKE protocols of their kind (using password and RSA).},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.2.474},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={February},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - An Efficient and Leakage-Resilient RSA-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with Tight Security Reduction
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 474
EP - 490
AU - SeongHan SHIN
AU - Kazukuni KOBARA
AU - Hideki IMAI
PY - 2007
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.2.474
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E90-A
IS - 2
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - February 2007
AB - Both mutual authentication and generation of session keys can be accomplished by an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol. Let us consider the following situation: (1) a client, who communicates with many different servers, remembers only one password and has insecure devices (e.g., mobile phones or PDAs) with very-restricted computing power and built-in memory capacity; (2) the counterpart servers have enormous computing power, but they are not perfectly secure against various attacks (e.g., virus or hackers); (3) neither PKI (Public Key Infrastructures) nor TRM (Tamper-Resistant Modules) is available. The main goal of this paper is to provide security against the leakage of stored secrets as well as to attain high efficiency on client's side. For those, we propose an efficient and leakage-resilient RSA-based AKE (RSA-AKE) protocol suitable for the above situation whose authenticity is based on password and another secret. In the extended model where an adversary is given access to the stored secret of client, we prove that its security of the RSA-AKE protocol is reduced tightly to the RSA one-wayness in the random oracle model. We also show that the RSA-AKE protocol guarantees several security properties (e.g., security of password, multiple sever scenario with only one password, perfect forward secrecy and anonymity). To our best knowledge, the RSA-AKE protocol is the most efficient, in terms of both computation costs of client and communication costs, over the previous AKE protocols of their kind (using password and RSA).
ER -