RDES cryptosystem is an n-round DES in which an probabilistic swapping is added onto the right half of the input in each round. It is more effective than a simple increase of DES rounds for a countermeasure against differential attack. In this paper, we show that the RDES is also effective against linear cryptanalysis. We applied Matsui's search algorithm to find the best expression for RDES-1 and RDES-2. The results are as follows: (a) The 16-round RDES-1 is approximately as strong as a 22-round DES, and the 16-round RDES-2 is approximately as strong as a 29-round DES. (b) Linear cryptanalysis for a 16-round RDES-1 and a 16-round RDES-2 requires more than 264 known-plaintexts.
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Yasushi NAKAO, Toshinobu KANEKO, Kenji KOYAMA, Routo TERADA, "The Security of an RDES Cryptosystem against Linear Cryptanalysis" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E79-A, no. 1, pp. 12-19, January 1996, doi: .
Abstract: RDES cryptosystem is an n-round DES in which an probabilistic swapping is added onto the right half of the input in each round. It is more effective than a simple increase of DES rounds for a countermeasure against differential attack. In this paper, we show that the RDES is also effective against linear cryptanalysis. We applied Matsui's search algorithm to find the best expression for RDES-1 and RDES-2. The results are as follows: (a) The 16-round RDES-1 is approximately as strong as a 22-round DES, and the 16-round RDES-2 is approximately as strong as a 29-round DES. (b) Linear cryptanalysis for a 16-round RDES-1 and a 16-round RDES-2 requires more than 264 known-plaintexts.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e79-a_1_12/_p
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@ARTICLE{e79-a_1_12,
author={Yasushi NAKAO, Toshinobu KANEKO, Kenji KOYAMA, Routo TERADA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={The Security of an RDES Cryptosystem against Linear Cryptanalysis},
year={1996},
volume={E79-A},
number={1},
pages={12-19},
abstract={RDES cryptosystem is an n-round DES in which an probabilistic swapping is added onto the right half of the input in each round. It is more effective than a simple increase of DES rounds for a countermeasure against differential attack. In this paper, we show that the RDES is also effective against linear cryptanalysis. We applied Matsui's search algorithm to find the best expression for RDES-1 and RDES-2. The results are as follows: (a) The 16-round RDES-1 is approximately as strong as a 22-round DES, and the 16-round RDES-2 is approximately as strong as a 29-round DES. (b) Linear cryptanalysis for a 16-round RDES-1 and a 16-round RDES-2 requires more than 264 known-plaintexts.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - The Security of an RDES Cryptosystem against Linear Cryptanalysis
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 12
EP - 19
AU - Yasushi NAKAO
AU - Toshinobu KANEKO
AU - Kenji KOYAMA
AU - Routo TERADA
PY - 1996
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E79-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 1996
AB - RDES cryptosystem is an n-round DES in which an probabilistic swapping is added onto the right half of the input in each round. It is more effective than a simple increase of DES rounds for a countermeasure against differential attack. In this paper, we show that the RDES is also effective against linear cryptanalysis. We applied Matsui's search algorithm to find the best expression for RDES-1 and RDES-2. The results are as follows: (a) The 16-round RDES-1 is approximately as strong as a 22-round DES, and the 16-round RDES-2 is approximately as strong as a 29-round DES. (b) Linear cryptanalysis for a 16-round RDES-1 and a 16-round RDES-2 requires more than 264 known-plaintexts.
ER -