The certified discrete logarithm problem modulo p prime is a discrete logarithm problem under the conditions that the complete factorization of p-1 is given and by which the base g is certified to be a primitive root mod p. For the cryptosystems based on the intractability of certified discrete logarithm problem, Sakurai-Shizuya showed that breaking the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme reduces to breaking the Shamir 3-pass key transmission scheme with respect to the expected polynomial-time Turing reducibility. In this paper, we show that we can remove randomness from the reduction above, and replace the reducibility with the polynomial-time many-one. Since the converse reduction is known to hold with respect to the polynomial-time many-one reducibility, our result gives a stronger evidence for that the two schemes are completely equivalent as certified discrete log cryptosystems.
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Eikoh CHIDA, Toshiya ITOH, Hiroki SHIZUYA, "A Note on the Relationships among Certified Discrete Log Cryptosystems" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E86-A, no. 5, pp. 1198-1202, May 2003, doi: .
Abstract: The certified discrete logarithm problem modulo p prime is a discrete logarithm problem under the conditions that the complete factorization of p-1 is given and by which the base g is certified to be a primitive root mod p. For the cryptosystems based on the intractability of certified discrete logarithm problem, Sakurai-Shizuya showed that breaking the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme reduces to breaking the Shamir 3-pass key transmission scheme with respect to the expected polynomial-time Turing reducibility. In this paper, we show that we can remove randomness from the reduction above, and replace the reducibility with the polynomial-time many-one. Since the converse reduction is known to hold with respect to the polynomial-time many-one reducibility, our result gives a stronger evidence for that the two schemes are completely equivalent as certified discrete log cryptosystems.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e86-a_5_1198/_p
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@ARTICLE{e86-a_5_1198,
author={Eikoh CHIDA, Toshiya ITOH, Hiroki SHIZUYA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={A Note on the Relationships among Certified Discrete Log Cryptosystems},
year={2003},
volume={E86-A},
number={5},
pages={1198-1202},
abstract={The certified discrete logarithm problem modulo p prime is a discrete logarithm problem under the conditions that the complete factorization of p-1 is given and by which the base g is certified to be a primitive root mod p. For the cryptosystems based on the intractability of certified discrete logarithm problem, Sakurai-Shizuya showed that breaking the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme reduces to breaking the Shamir 3-pass key transmission scheme with respect to the expected polynomial-time Turing reducibility. In this paper, we show that we can remove randomness from the reduction above, and replace the reducibility with the polynomial-time many-one. Since the converse reduction is known to hold with respect to the polynomial-time many-one reducibility, our result gives a stronger evidence for that the two schemes are completely equivalent as certified discrete log cryptosystems.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={May},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - A Note on the Relationships among Certified Discrete Log Cryptosystems
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1198
EP - 1202
AU - Eikoh CHIDA
AU - Toshiya ITOH
AU - Hiroki SHIZUYA
PY - 2003
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E86-A
IS - 5
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - May 2003
AB - The certified discrete logarithm problem modulo p prime is a discrete logarithm problem under the conditions that the complete factorization of p-1 is given and by which the base g is certified to be a primitive root mod p. For the cryptosystems based on the intractability of certified discrete logarithm problem, Sakurai-Shizuya showed that breaking the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme reduces to breaking the Shamir 3-pass key transmission scheme with respect to the expected polynomial-time Turing reducibility. In this paper, we show that we can remove randomness from the reduction above, and replace the reducibility with the polynomial-time many-one. Since the converse reduction is known to hold with respect to the polynomial-time many-one reducibility, our result gives a stronger evidence for that the two schemes are completely equivalent as certified discrete log cryptosystems.
ER -