The Role of Arbiters for Unconditionally Secure Authentication

Goichiro HANAOKA; Junji SHIKATA; Yumiko HANAOKA; Hideki IMAI

The Role of Arbiters for Unconditionally Secure Authentication

Goichiro HANAOKA, Junji SHIKATA, Yumiko HANAOKA, Hideki IMAI

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Authentication codes (A-codes, for short) are considered as important building blocks for constructing unconditionally secure authentication schemes. Since in the conventional A-codes, two communicating parties, transmitter and receiver, utilized a common secret key, and such A-codes do not provide non-repudiation. With the aim of enhancing with non-repudiation property, Simmons introduced A²-codes. Later, Johansson formally defined an improved version of A²-codes called, the A³-codes. Unlike A²-codes, A³-codes do not require an arbiter to be fully trusted. In this paper, we clarify the security definition of A³-codes which may be misdefined. We show a concrete attack against an A³-code and conclude that concrete constructions of A³-codes implicitly assumes a trusted arbiter. We also show that there is no significant difference between A²-codes and A³-codes in a practical sense and further argue that it is impossible to construct an "ideal" A³-codes, that is, without any trusted arbiter. Finally, we introduce a novel model of asymmetric A-codes with an arbiter but do not have to be fully trusted, and also show a concrete construction of the asymmetric A-codes for the model. Since our proposed A-code does not require fully trusted arbiters, it is more secure than A²-codes or A³-codes.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E87-A No.5 pp.1132-1140

Publication Date: 2004/05/01

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Type of Manuscript: Special Section LETTER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)

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Goichiro HANAOKA, Junji SHIKATA, Yumiko HANAOKA, Hideki IMAI, "The Role of Arbiters for Unconditionally Secure Authentication" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E87-A, no. 5, pp. 1132-1140, May 2004, doi: .
Abstract: Authentication codes (A-codes, for short) are considered as important building blocks for constructing unconditionally secure authentication schemes. Since in the conventional A-codes, two communicating parties, transmitter and receiver, utilized a common secret key, and such A-codes do not provide non-repudiation. With the aim of enhancing with non-repudiation property, Simmons introduced A²-codes. Later, Johansson formally defined an improved version of A²-codes called, the A³-codes. Unlike A²-codes, A³-codes do not require an arbiter to be fully trusted. In this paper, we clarify the security definition of A³-codes which may be misdefined. We show a concrete attack against an A³-code and conclude that concrete constructions of A³-codes implicitly assumes a trusted arbiter. We also show that there is no significant difference between A²-codes and A³-codes in a practical sense and further argue that it is impossible to construct an "ideal" A³-codes, that is, without any trusted arbiter. Finally, we introduce a novel model of asymmetric A-codes with an arbiter but do not have to be fully trusted, and also show a concrete construction of the asymmetric A-codes for the model. Since our proposed A-code does not require fully trusted arbiters, it is more secure than A²-codes or A³-codes.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e87-a_5_1132/_p

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@ARTICLE{e87-a_5_1132,
author={Goichiro HANAOKA, Junji SHIKATA, Yumiko HANAOKA, Hideki IMAI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={The Role of Arbiters for Unconditionally Secure Authentication},
year={2004},
volume={E87-A},
number={5},
pages={1132-1140},
abstract={Authentication codes (A-codes, for short) are considered as important building blocks for constructing unconditionally secure authentication schemes. Since in the conventional A-codes, two communicating parties, transmitter and receiver, utilized a common secret key, and such A-codes do not provide non-repudiation. With the aim of enhancing with non-repudiation property, Simmons introduced A²-codes. Later, Johansson formally defined an improved version of A²-codes called, the A³-codes. Unlike A²-codes, A³-codes do not require an arbiter to be fully trusted. In this paper, we clarify the security definition of A³-codes which may be misdefined. We show a concrete attack against an A³-code and conclude that concrete constructions of A³-codes implicitly assumes a trusted arbiter. We also show that there is no significant difference between A²-codes and A³-codes in a practical sense and further argue that it is impossible to construct an "ideal" A³-codes, that is, without any trusted arbiter. Finally, we introduce a novel model of asymmetric A-codes with an arbiter but do not have to be fully trusted, and also show a concrete construction of the asymmetric A-codes for the model. Since our proposed A-code does not require fully trusted arbiters, it is more secure than A²-codes or A³-codes.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={May},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - The Role of Arbiters for Unconditionally Secure Authentication
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1132
EP - 1140
AU - Goichiro HANAOKA
AU - Junji SHIKATA
AU - Yumiko HANAOKA
AU - Hideki IMAI
PY - 2004
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E87-A
IS - 5
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - May 2004
AB - Authentication codes (A-codes, for short) are considered as important building blocks for constructing unconditionally secure authentication schemes. Since in the conventional A-codes, two communicating parties, transmitter and receiver, utilized a common secret key, and such A-codes do not provide non-repudiation. With the aim of enhancing with non-repudiation property, Simmons introduced A²-codes. Later, Johansson formally defined an improved version of A²-codes called, the A³-codes. Unlike A²-codes, A³-codes do not require an arbiter to be fully trusted. In this paper, we clarify the security definition of A³-codes which may be misdefined. We show a concrete attack against an A³-code and conclude that concrete constructions of A³-codes implicitly assumes a trusted arbiter. We also show that there is no significant difference between A²-codes and A³-codes in a practical sense and further argue that it is impossible to construct an "ideal" A³-codes, that is, without any trusted arbiter. Finally, we introduce a novel model of asymmetric A-codes with an arbiter but do not have to be fully trusted, and also show a concrete construction of the asymmetric A-codes for the model. Since our proposed A-code does not require fully trusted arbiters, it is more secure than A²-codes or A³-codes.
ER -