Improved Multiple Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Midori128

Mohamed TOLBA; Ahmed ABDELKHALEK; Amr M. YOUSSEF

doi:10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1733

Improved Multiple Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Midori128

Mohamed TOLBA, Ahmed ABDELKHALEK, Amr M. YOUSSEF

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Midori128 is a lightweight block cipher proposed at ASIACRYPT 2015 to achieve low energy consumption per bit. Currently, the best published impossible differential attack on Midori128 covers 10 rounds without the pre-whitening key. By exploiting the special structure of the S-boxes and the binary linear transformation layer in Midori128, we present impossible differential distinguishers that cover 7 full rounds including the mix column operations. Then, we exploit four of these distinguishers to launch multiple impossible differential attack against 11 rounds of the cipher with the pre-whitening and post-whitening keys.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E100-A No.8 pp.1733-1737

Publication Date: 2017/08/01

Publicized

Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1733

Type of Manuscript: LETTER

Category: Cryptography and Information Security

Authors

Mohamed TOLBA
  Concordia University
Ahmed ABDELKHALEK
  Concordia University
Amr M. YOUSSEF
  Concordia University

Keyword

cryptanalysis, impossible differential cryptanalysis, block ciphers, Midori128

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Mohamed TOLBA, Ahmed ABDELKHALEK, Amr M. YOUSSEF, "Improved Multiple Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Midori128" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E100-A, no. 8, pp. 1733-1737, August 2017, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1733.
Abstract: Midori128 is a lightweight block cipher proposed at ASIACRYPT 2015 to achieve low energy consumption per bit. Currently, the best published impossible differential attack on Midori128 covers 10 rounds without the pre-whitening key. By exploiting the special structure of the S-boxes and the binary linear transformation layer in Midori128, we present impossible differential distinguishers that cover 7 full rounds including the mix column operations. Then, we exploit four of these distinguishers to launch multiple impossible differential attack against 11 rounds of the cipher with the pre-whitening and post-whitening keys.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1733/_p

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@ARTICLE{e100-a_8_1733,
author={Mohamed TOLBA, Ahmed ABDELKHALEK, Amr M. YOUSSEF, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Improved Multiple Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Midori128},
year={2017},
volume={E100-A},
number={8},
pages={1733-1737},
abstract={Midori128 is a lightweight block cipher proposed at ASIACRYPT 2015 to achieve low energy consumption per bit. Currently, the best published impossible differential attack on Midori128 covers 10 rounds without the pre-whitening key. By exploiting the special structure of the S-boxes and the binary linear transformation layer in Midori128, we present impossible differential distinguishers that cover 7 full rounds including the mix column operations. Then, we exploit four of these distinguishers to launch multiple impossible differential attack against 11 rounds of the cipher with the pre-whitening and post-whitening keys.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1733},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={August},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Improved Multiple Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Midori128
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1733
EP - 1737
AU - Mohamed TOLBA
AU - Ahmed ABDELKHALEK
AU - Amr M. YOUSSEF
PY - 2017
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1733
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E100-A
IS - 8
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - August 2017
AB - Midori128 is a lightweight block cipher proposed at ASIACRYPT 2015 to achieve low energy consumption per bit. Currently, the best published impossible differential attack on Midori128 covers 10 rounds without the pre-whitening key. By exploiting the special structure of the S-boxes and the binary linear transformation layer in Midori128, we present impossible differential distinguishers that cover 7 full rounds including the mix column operations. Then, we exploit four of these distinguishers to launch multiple impossible differential attack against 11 rounds of the cipher with the pre-whitening and post-whitening keys.
ER -