Performance Improvement of Power Analysis Attacks on AES with Encryption-Related Signals

You-Seok LEE; Young-Jun LEE; Dong-Guk HAN; Ho-Won KIM; Hyoung-Nam KIM

doi:10.1587/transfun.E95.A.1091

Performance Improvement of Power Analysis Attacks on AES with Encryption-Related Signals

You-Seok LEE, Young-Jun LEE, Dong-Guk HAN, Ho-Won KIM, Hyoung-Nam KIM

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A power analysis attack is a well-known side-channel attack but the efficiency of the attack is frequently degraded by the existence of power components, irrelative to the encryption included in signals used for the attack. To enhance the performance of the power analysis attack, we propose a preprocessing method based on extracting encryption-related parts from the measured power signals. Experimental results show that the attacks with the preprocessed signals detect correct keys with much fewer signals, compared to the conventional power analysis attacks.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E95-A No.6 pp.1091-1094

Publication Date: 2012/06/01

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Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E95.A.1091

Type of Manuscript: LETTER

Category: Cryptography and Information Security

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You-Seok LEE, Young-Jun LEE, Dong-Guk HAN, Ho-Won KIM, Hyoung-Nam KIM, "Performance Improvement of Power Analysis Attacks on AES with Encryption-Related Signals" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E95-A, no. 6, pp. 1091-1094, June 2012, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E95.A.1091.
Abstract: A power analysis attack is a well-known side-channel attack but the efficiency of the attack is frequently degraded by the existence of power components, irrelative to the encryption included in signals used for the attack. To enhance the performance of the power analysis attack, we propose a preprocessing method based on extracting encryption-related parts from the measured power signals. Experimental results show that the attacks with the preprocessed signals detect correct keys with much fewer signals, compared to the conventional power analysis attacks.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E95.A.1091/_p

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@ARTICLE{e95-a_6_1091,
author={You-Seok LEE, Young-Jun LEE, Dong-Guk HAN, Ho-Won KIM, Hyoung-Nam KIM, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Performance Improvement of Power Analysis Attacks on AES with Encryption-Related Signals},
year={2012},
volume={E95-A},
number={6},
pages={1091-1094},
abstract={A power analysis attack is a well-known side-channel attack but the efficiency of the attack is frequently degraded by the existence of power components, irrelative to the encryption included in signals used for the attack. To enhance the performance of the power analysis attack, we propose a preprocessing method based on extracting encryption-related parts from the measured power signals. Experimental results show that the attacks with the preprocessed signals detect correct keys with much fewer signals, compared to the conventional power analysis attacks.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E95.A.1091},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={June},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Performance Improvement of Power Analysis Attacks on AES with Encryption-Related Signals
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1091
EP - 1094
AU - You-Seok LEE
AU - Young-Jun LEE
AU - Dong-Guk HAN
AU - Ho-Won KIM
AU - Hyoung-Nam KIM
PY - 2012
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E95.A.1091
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E95-A
IS - 6
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - June 2012
AB - A power analysis attack is a well-known side-channel attack but the efficiency of the attack is frequently degraded by the existence of power components, irrelative to the encryption included in signals used for the attack. To enhance the performance of the power analysis attack, we propose a preprocessing method based on extracting encryption-related parts from the measured power signals. Experimental results show that the attacks with the preprocessed signals detect correct keys with much fewer signals, compared to the conventional power analysis attacks.
ER -