Leakage-Resilience of Stateless/Stateful Public-Key Encryption from Hash Proofs

Manh Ha NGUYEN; Kenji YASUNAGA; Keisuke TANAKA

doi:10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1100

Leakage-Resilience of Stateless/Stateful Public-Key Encryption from Hash Proofs

Manh Ha NGUYEN, Kenji YASUNAGA, Keisuke TANAKA

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We consider the problem of constructing public-key encryption (PKE) schemes that are resilient to a-posteriori chosen-ciphertext and key-leakage attacks (LR-CCA2). In CTYPTO'09, Naor and Segev proved that the Naor-Yung generic construction of PKE which is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) is also secure against key-leakage attacks. They also presented a variant of the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, and showed that this PKE scheme is LR-CCA2-secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this paper, we apply the generic construction of “Universal Hash Proofs and a Paradigm for Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Secure Public-Key Encryption” (EUROCRYPT'02) to generalize the above work of Naor-Segev. In comparing to the first construction of Naor-Segev, ours is more efficient because of not using simulation-sound NIZK. We also extend it to stateful PKE schemes. Concretely, we present the notion of LR-CCA2 attack in the case of stateful PKE, and a generic construction of stateful PKE that is secure against this attack.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E96-A No.6 pp.1100-1111

Publication Date: 2013/06/01

Publicized

Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1100

Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)

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Authors

Manh Ha NGUYEN
  Tokyo Institute of Techonology
Kenji YASUNAGA
  Tokyo Institute of Techonology
Keisuke TANAKA
  Tokyo Institute of Techonology

Keyword

public key encryption, hash proof system, key-leakage, chosen-ciphertext attack

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Manh Ha NGUYEN, Kenji YASUNAGA, Keisuke TANAKA, "Leakage-Resilience of Stateless/Stateful Public-Key Encryption from Hash Proofs" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E96-A, no. 6, pp. 1100-1111, June 2013, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1100.
Abstract: We consider the problem of constructing public-key encryption (PKE) schemes that are resilient to a-posteriori chosen-ciphertext and key-leakage attacks (LR-CCA2). In CTYPTO'09, Naor and Segev proved that the Naor-Yung generic construction of PKE which is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) is also secure against key-leakage attacks. They also presented a variant of the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, and showed that this PKE scheme is LR-CCA2-secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this paper, we apply the generic construction of “Universal Hash Proofs and a Paradigm for Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Secure Public-Key Encryption” (EUROCRYPT'02) to generalize the above work of Naor-Segev. In comparing to the first construction of Naor-Segev, ours is more efficient because of not using simulation-sound NIZK. We also extend it to stateful PKE schemes. Concretely, we present the notion of LR-CCA2 attack in the case of stateful PKE, and a generic construction of stateful PKE that is secure against this attack.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1100/_p

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@ARTICLE{e96-a_6_1100,
author={Manh Ha NGUYEN, Kenji YASUNAGA, Keisuke TANAKA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Leakage-Resilience of Stateless/Stateful Public-Key Encryption from Hash Proofs},
year={2013},
volume={E96-A},
number={6},
pages={1100-1111},
abstract={We consider the problem of constructing public-key encryption (PKE) schemes that are resilient to a-posteriori chosen-ciphertext and key-leakage attacks (LR-CCA2). In CTYPTO'09, Naor and Segev proved that the Naor-Yung generic construction of PKE which is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) is also secure against key-leakage attacks. They also presented a variant of the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, and showed that this PKE scheme is LR-CCA2-secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this paper, we apply the generic construction of “Universal Hash Proofs and a Paradigm for Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Secure Public-Key Encryption” (EUROCRYPT'02) to generalize the above work of Naor-Segev. In comparing to the first construction of Naor-Segev, ours is more efficient because of not using simulation-sound NIZK. We also extend it to stateful PKE schemes. Concretely, we present the notion of LR-CCA2 attack in the case of stateful PKE, and a generic construction of stateful PKE that is secure against this attack.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1100},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={June},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Leakage-Resilience of Stateless/Stateful Public-Key Encryption from Hash Proofs
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1100
EP - 1111
AU - Manh Ha NGUYEN
AU - Kenji YASUNAGA
AU - Keisuke TANAKA
PY - 2013
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.1100
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E96-A
IS - 6
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - June 2013
AB - We consider the problem of constructing public-key encryption (PKE) schemes that are resilient to a-posteriori chosen-ciphertext and key-leakage attacks (LR-CCA2). In CTYPTO'09, Naor and Segev proved that the Naor-Yung generic construction of PKE which is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) is also secure against key-leakage attacks. They also presented a variant of the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, and showed that this PKE scheme is LR-CCA2-secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this paper, we apply the generic construction of “Universal Hash Proofs and a Paradigm for Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Secure Public-Key Encryption” (EUROCRYPT'02) to generalize the above work of Naor-Segev. In comparing to the first construction of Naor-Segev, ours is more efficient because of not using simulation-sound NIZK. We also extend it to stateful PKE schemes. Concretely, we present the notion of LR-CCA2 attack in the case of stateful PKE, and a generic construction of stateful PKE that is secure against this attack.
ER -