Secure Hierarchical Identity-Based Identification without Random Oracles

Atsushi FUJIOKA; Taiichi SAITO; Keita XAGAWA

doi:10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1307

Secure Hierarchical Identity-Based Identification without Random Oracles

Atsushi FUJIOKA, Taiichi SAITO, Keita XAGAWA

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This paper proposes a generic construction of hierarchical identity-based identification (HIBI) protocols secure against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks in the standard model. The proposed construction converts a digital signature scheme existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks, where the scheme has a protocol for showing possession of a signing key, not a signature. Our construction is based on the so-called certificate-based construction of hierarchical identity-based cryptosystems, and utilizes a variant of the well-known OR-proof technique to ensure the security against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks. We also present several concrete examples of our construction employing the Waters signature (EUROCRYPT 2005), and other signatures. As results, its concurrent security of each instantiation is proved under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, the RSA assumption, or their variants in the standard model. Chin, Heng, and Goi proposed an HIBI protocol passively and concurrently secure under the CDH and one-more CDH assumption, respectively (FGIT-SecTech 2009). However, its security is proved in the random oracle model.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E97-A No.6 pp.1307-1317

Publication Date: 2014/06/01

Publicized

Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1307

Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)

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Authors

Atsushi FUJIOKA
  Kanagawa University
Taiichi SAITO
  Tokyo Denki University
Keita XAGAWA
  NTT Corporation

Keyword

hierarchical identity-based identification, impersonation under active and concurrent attacks, computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, RSA assumption

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Atsushi FUJIOKA, Taiichi SAITO, Keita XAGAWA, "Secure Hierarchical Identity-Based Identification without Random Oracles" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E97-A, no. 6, pp. 1307-1317, June 2014, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1307.
Abstract: This paper proposes a generic construction of hierarchical identity-based identification (HIBI) protocols secure against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks in the standard model. The proposed construction converts a digital signature scheme existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks, where the scheme has a protocol for showing possession of a signing key, not a signature. Our construction is based on the so-called certificate-based construction of hierarchical identity-based cryptosystems, and utilizes a variant of the well-known OR-proof technique to ensure the security against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks. We also present several concrete examples of our construction employing the Waters signature (EUROCRYPT 2005), and other signatures. As results, its concurrent security of each instantiation is proved under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, the RSA assumption, or their variants in the standard model. Chin, Heng, and Goi proposed an HIBI protocol passively and concurrently secure under the CDH and one-more CDH assumption, respectively (FGIT-SecTech 2009). However, its security is proved in the random oracle model.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1307/_p

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@ARTICLE{e97-a_6_1307,
author={Atsushi FUJIOKA, Taiichi SAITO, Keita XAGAWA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Secure Hierarchical Identity-Based Identification without Random Oracles},
year={2014},
volume={E97-A},
number={6},
pages={1307-1317},
abstract={This paper proposes a generic construction of hierarchical identity-based identification (HIBI) protocols secure against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks in the standard model. The proposed construction converts a digital signature scheme existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks, where the scheme has a protocol for showing possession of a signing key, not a signature. Our construction is based on the so-called certificate-based construction of hierarchical identity-based cryptosystems, and utilizes a variant of the well-known OR-proof technique to ensure the security against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks. We also present several concrete examples of our construction employing the Waters signature (EUROCRYPT 2005), and other signatures. As results, its concurrent security of each instantiation is proved under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, the RSA assumption, or their variants in the standard model. Chin, Heng, and Goi proposed an HIBI protocol passively and concurrently secure under the CDH and one-more CDH assumption, respectively (FGIT-SecTech 2009). However, its security is proved in the random oracle model.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1307},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={June},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Secure Hierarchical Identity-Based Identification without Random Oracles
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1307
EP - 1317
AU - Atsushi FUJIOKA
AU - Taiichi SAITO
AU - Keita XAGAWA
PY - 2014
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1307
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E97-A
IS - 6
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - June 2014
AB - This paper proposes a generic construction of hierarchical identity-based identification (HIBI) protocols secure against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks in the standard model. The proposed construction converts a digital signature scheme existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks, where the scheme has a protocol for showing possession of a signing key, not a signature. Our construction is based on the so-called certificate-based construction of hierarchical identity-based cryptosystems, and utilizes a variant of the well-known OR-proof technique to ensure the security against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks. We also present several concrete examples of our construction employing the Waters signature (EUROCRYPT 2005), and other signatures. As results, its concurrent security of each instantiation is proved under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, the RSA assumption, or their variants in the standard model. Chin, Heng, and Goi proposed an HIBI protocol passively and concurrently secure under the CDH and one-more CDH assumption, respectively (FGIT-SecTech 2009). However, its security is proved in the random oracle model.
ER -