Trivium is a synchronous stream cipher using three shift registers. It is designed to have a simple structure and runs at high speed. A scan-based side-channel attack retrieves secret information using scan chains, one of design-for-test techniques. In this paper, a scan-based side-channel attack method against Trivium using scan signatures is proposed. In our method, we reconstruct a previous internal state in Trivium one by one from the internal state just when a ciphertext is generated. When we retrieve the internal state, we focus on a particular 1-bit position in a collection of scan chains and then we can attack Trivium even if the scan chain includes other registers than internal state registers in Trivium. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully retrieves a plaintext from a ciphertext generated by Trivium.
Mika FUJISHIRO
Waseda University
Masao YANAGISAWA
Waseda University
Nozomu TOGAWA
Waseda University
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Mika FUJISHIRO, Masao YANAGISAWA, Nozomu TOGAWA, "Scan-Based Attack against Trivium Stream Cipher Using Scan Signatures" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E97-A, no. 7, pp. 1444-1451, July 2014, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1444.
Abstract: Trivium is a synchronous stream cipher using three shift registers. It is designed to have a simple structure and runs at high speed. A scan-based side-channel attack retrieves secret information using scan chains, one of design-for-test techniques. In this paper, a scan-based side-channel attack method against Trivium using scan signatures is proposed. In our method, we reconstruct a previous internal state in Trivium one by one from the internal state just when a ciphertext is generated. When we retrieve the internal state, we focus on a particular 1-bit position in a collection of scan chains and then we can attack Trivium even if the scan chain includes other registers than internal state registers in Trivium. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully retrieves a plaintext from a ciphertext generated by Trivium.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1444/_p
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@ARTICLE{e97-a_7_1444,
author={Mika FUJISHIRO, Masao YANAGISAWA, Nozomu TOGAWA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Scan-Based Attack against Trivium Stream Cipher Using Scan Signatures},
year={2014},
volume={E97-A},
number={7},
pages={1444-1451},
abstract={Trivium is a synchronous stream cipher using three shift registers. It is designed to have a simple structure and runs at high speed. A scan-based side-channel attack retrieves secret information using scan chains, one of design-for-test techniques. In this paper, a scan-based side-channel attack method against Trivium using scan signatures is proposed. In our method, we reconstruct a previous internal state in Trivium one by one from the internal state just when a ciphertext is generated. When we retrieve the internal state, we focus on a particular 1-bit position in a collection of scan chains and then we can attack Trivium even if the scan chain includes other registers than internal state registers in Trivium. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully retrieves a plaintext from a ciphertext generated by Trivium.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1444},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={July},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Scan-Based Attack against Trivium Stream Cipher Using Scan Signatures
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1444
EP - 1451
AU - Mika FUJISHIRO
AU - Masao YANAGISAWA
AU - Nozomu TOGAWA
PY - 2014
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E97.A.1444
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E97-A
IS - 7
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - July 2014
AB - Trivium is a synchronous stream cipher using three shift registers. It is designed to have a simple structure and runs at high speed. A scan-based side-channel attack retrieves secret information using scan chains, one of design-for-test techniques. In this paper, a scan-based side-channel attack method against Trivium using scan signatures is proposed. In our method, we reconstruct a previous internal state in Trivium one by one from the internal state just when a ciphertext is generated. When we retrieve the internal state, we focus on a particular 1-bit position in a collection of scan chains and then we can attack Trivium even if the scan chain includes other registers than internal state registers in Trivium. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully retrieves a plaintext from a ciphertext generated by Trivium.
ER -