Hidden Credential Retrieval, Revisited

SeongHan SHIN; Kazukuni KOBARA

doi:10.1587/transfun.E98.A.428

Hidden Credential Retrieval, Revisited

SeongHan SHIN, Kazukuni KOBARA

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Hidden Credential Retrieval (HCR) protocols are designed for access credentials management where users who remember short passwords can retrieve his/her various credentials (access keys and tokens) with the help of a remote storage server over insecure networks (e.g., the Internet). In this paper, we revisit two HCR protocols, both of which are based on blind signature schemes: one (we call it B-HCR) was proposed in ASIACCS 2009 and the other (we call it MRS-HCR) was in WISA 2010. In particular, we show that the B-HCR protocol is insecure against an outside attacker who impersonates server S. Specifically, the attacker can find out the user's password pw with off-line dictionary attacks by eavesdropping the communications between the user and a third-party online service provider. Also, we show that the MRS-HCR protocol does not work correctly itself. In other words, user U can not retrieve the plaintext Msg (i.e., credentials) even if he/she has a knowledge of the password.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E98-A No.1 pp.428-433

Publication Date: 2015/01/01

Publicized

Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.428

Type of Manuscript: LETTER

Category: Cryptography and Information Security

Authors

SeongHan SHIN
National Institute of Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
Kazukuni KOBARA
National Institute of Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)

Keyword

credentials management, passwords, on-line/off-line dictionary attacks, insider/outsider attacks

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SeongHan SHIN, Kazukuni KOBARA, "Hidden Credential Retrieval, Revisited" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E98-A, no. 1, pp. 428-433, January 2015, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.428.
Abstract: Hidden Credential Retrieval (HCR) protocols are designed for access credentials management where users who remember short passwords can retrieve his/her various credentials (access keys and tokens) with the help of a remote storage server over insecure networks (e.g., the Internet). In this paper, we revisit two HCR protocols, both of which are based on blind signature schemes: one (we call it B-HCR) was proposed in ASIACCS 2009 and the other (we call it MRS-HCR) was in WISA 2010. In particular, we show that the B-HCR protocol is insecure against an outside attacker who impersonates server S. Specifically, the attacker can find out the user's password pw with off-line dictionary attacks by eavesdropping the communications between the user and a third-party online service provider. Also, we show that the MRS-HCR protocol does not work correctly itself. In other words, user U can not retrieve the plaintext Msg (i.e., credentials) even if he/she has a knowledge of the password.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E98.A.428/_p

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@ARTICLE{e98-a_1_428,
author={SeongHan SHIN, Kazukuni KOBARA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Hidden Credential Retrieval, Revisited},
year={2015},
volume={E98-A},
number={1},
pages={428-433},
abstract={Hidden Credential Retrieval (HCR) protocols are designed for access credentials management where users who remember short passwords can retrieve his/her various credentials (access keys and tokens) with the help of a remote storage server over insecure networks (e.g., the Internet). In this paper, we revisit two HCR protocols, both of which are based on blind signature schemes: one (we call it B-HCR) was proposed in ASIACCS 2009 and the other (we call it MRS-HCR) was in WISA 2010. In particular, we show that the B-HCR protocol is insecure against an outside attacker who impersonates server S. Specifically, the attacker can find out the user's password pw with off-line dictionary attacks by eavesdropping the communications between the user and a third-party online service provider. Also, we show that the MRS-HCR protocol does not work correctly itself. In other words, user U can not retrieve the plaintext Msg (i.e., credentials) even if he/she has a knowledge of the password.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E98.A.428},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Hidden Credential Retrieval, Revisited
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 428
EP - 433
AU - SeongHan SHIN
AU - Kazukuni KOBARA
PY - 2015
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.428
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E98-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2015
AB - Hidden Credential Retrieval (HCR) protocols are designed for access credentials management where users who remember short passwords can retrieve his/her various credentials (access keys and tokens) with the help of a remote storage server over insecure networks (e.g., the Internet). In this paper, we revisit two HCR protocols, both of which are based on blind signature schemes: one (we call it B-HCR) was proposed in ASIACCS 2009 and the other (we call it MRS-HCR) was in WISA 2010. In particular, we show that the B-HCR protocol is insecure against an outside attacker who impersonates server S. Specifically, the attacker can find out the user's password pw with off-line dictionary attacks by eavesdropping the communications between the user and a third-party online service provider. Also, we show that the MRS-HCR protocol does not work correctly itself. In other words, user U can not retrieve the plaintext Msg (i.e., credentials) even if he/she has a knowledge of the password.
ER -