Security Analysis of an Efficient Identity-Based Proxy Signature in the Standard Model

Xiaoming HU; Yinchun YANG; Jian WANG; Huajie XU; Wenan TAN

doi:10.1587/transfun.E98.A.758

Security Analysis of an Efficient Identity-Based Proxy Signature in the Standard Model

Xiaoming HU, Yinchun YANG, Jian WANG, Huajie XU, Wenan TAN

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Presently, many identity-based proxy signature (IBPS) schemes have been proposed, but most of them require high computational costs and the proposed security model for IBPS is not enough complete. To overcome this weakness, Gu et al. recently proposed a framework and a detailed security model for IBPS. They also proposed an efficient IBPS scheme and proved the unforgeability of their scheme in the standard model. However, in this letter, we demonstrate that Gu et al.'s scheme fails to satisfy the property of unforgeability because it can not resist the following attacks: after getting a private key, an adversary behaving as a malicious signer can forge a private key on any identity without the help of the private key generator (PKG); after getting a delegation, an adversary behaving as a malicious proxy signer can forge a proxy signing key on any delegation without the agreement of the original signer; after getting a signature, an adversary behaving as a malicious user can forge a signature on any identity without the private key or forge a proxy signature on any warrant without the proxy signing key.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E98-A No.2 pp.758-761

Publication Date: 2015/02/01

Publicized

Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.758

Type of Manuscript: LETTER

Category: Cryptography and Information Security

Authors

Xiaoming HU
  Shanghai Second Polytechnic University
Yinchun YANG
  Shanghai Second Polytechnic University
Jian WANG
  Shanghai Second Polytechnic University
Huajie XU
  Guangxi University
Wenan TAN
  Shanghai Second Polytechnic University

Keyword

cryptography, security analysis, ID-based proxy signature, standard model

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Xiaoming HU, Yinchun YANG, Jian WANG, Huajie XU, Wenan TAN, "Security Analysis of an Efficient Identity-Based Proxy Signature in the Standard Model" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E98-A, no. 2, pp. 758-761, February 2015, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.758.
Abstract: Presently, many identity-based proxy signature (IBPS) schemes have been proposed, but most of them require high computational costs and the proposed security model for IBPS is not enough complete. To overcome this weakness, Gu et al. recently proposed a framework and a detailed security model for IBPS. They also proposed an efficient IBPS scheme and proved the unforgeability of their scheme in the standard model. However, in this letter, we demonstrate that Gu et al.'s scheme fails to satisfy the property of unforgeability because it can not resist the following attacks: after getting a private key, an adversary behaving as a malicious signer can forge a private key on any identity without the help of the private key generator (PKG); after getting a delegation, an adversary behaving as a malicious proxy signer can forge a proxy signing key on any delegation without the agreement of the original signer; after getting a signature, an adversary behaving as a malicious user can forge a signature on any identity without the private key or forge a proxy signature on any warrant without the proxy signing key.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E98.A.758/_p

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@ARTICLE{e98-a_2_758,
author={Xiaoming HU, Yinchun YANG, Jian WANG, Huajie XU, Wenan TAN, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Security Analysis of an Efficient Identity-Based Proxy Signature in the Standard Model},
year={2015},
volume={E98-A},
number={2},
pages={758-761},
abstract={Presently, many identity-based proxy signature (IBPS) schemes have been proposed, but most of them require high computational costs and the proposed security model for IBPS is not enough complete. To overcome this weakness, Gu et al. recently proposed a framework and a detailed security model for IBPS. They also proposed an efficient IBPS scheme and proved the unforgeability of their scheme in the standard model. However, in this letter, we demonstrate that Gu et al.'s scheme fails to satisfy the property of unforgeability because it can not resist the following attacks: after getting a private key, an adversary behaving as a malicious signer can forge a private key on any identity without the help of the private key generator (PKG); after getting a delegation, an adversary behaving as a malicious proxy signer can forge a proxy signing key on any delegation without the agreement of the original signer; after getting a signature, an adversary behaving as a malicious user can forge a signature on any identity without the private key or forge a proxy signature on any warrant without the proxy signing key.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E98.A.758},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={February},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Security Analysis of an Efficient Identity-Based Proxy Signature in the Standard Model
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 758
EP - 761
AU - Xiaoming HU
AU - Yinchun YANG
AU - Jian WANG
AU - Huajie XU
AU - Wenan TAN
PY - 2015
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.758
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E98-A
IS - 2
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - February 2015
AB - Presently, many identity-based proxy signature (IBPS) schemes have been proposed, but most of them require high computational costs and the proposed security model for IBPS is not enough complete. To overcome this weakness, Gu et al. recently proposed a framework and a detailed security model for IBPS. They also proposed an efficient IBPS scheme and proved the unforgeability of their scheme in the standard model. However, in this letter, we demonstrate that Gu et al.'s scheme fails to satisfy the property of unforgeability because it can not resist the following attacks: after getting a private key, an adversary behaving as a malicious signer can forge a private key on any identity without the help of the private key generator (PKG); after getting a delegation, an adversary behaving as a malicious proxy signer can forge a proxy signing key on any delegation without the agreement of the original signer; after getting a signature, an adversary behaving as a malicious user can forge a signature on any identity without the private key or forge a proxy signature on any warrant without the proxy signing key.
ER -