A Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on Reduced-Round Kalyna-<I>b</I>/2<I>b</I>

Riham ALTAWY; Ahmed ABDELKHALEK; Amr M. YOUSSEF

doi:10.1587/transinf.2015EDL8174

A Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on Reduced-Round Kalyna-b/2b

Riham ALTAWY, Ahmed ABDELKHALEK, Amr M. YOUSSEF

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In this letter, we present a meet-in-the-middle attack on the 7-round reduced block cipher Kalyna-b/2b, which has been approved as the new encryption standard of Ukraine (DSTU 7624:2014) in 2015. According to its designers, the cipher provides strength to several cryptanalytic methods after the fifth and sixth rounds of the versions with block length of 128 and 256 bits, respectively. Our attack is based on the differential enumeration approach, where we carefully deploy a four-round distinguisher in the first four rounds to bypass the effect of the carry bits resulting from the prewhitening modular key addition. We also exploit the linear relation between consecutive odd and even indexed round keys, which enables us to attack seven rounds and recover all the round keys incrementally. The attack on Kalyna with 128-bit block has a data complexity of 2⁸⁹ chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2^230.2 and a memory complexity of 2^202.64. The data, time and memory complexities of our attack on Kalyna with 256-bit block are 2²³³, 2^502.2 and 2¹⁷⁰, respectively.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E99-D No.4 pp.1246-1250

Publication Date: 2016/04/01

Publicized: 2016/01/22

Online ISSN: 1745-1361

DOI: 10.1587/transinf.2015EDL8174

Type of Manuscript: LETTER

Category: Information Network

Authors

Riham ALTAWY
  Concordia University
Ahmed ABDELKHALEK
  Concordia University
Amr M. YOUSSEF
  Concordia University

Keyword

Kalyna, cryptanalysis, meet-in-the-middle attacks, differential enumeration, DSTU 7624:2014

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Riham ALTAWY, Ahmed ABDELKHALEK, Amr M. YOUSSEF, "A Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on Reduced-Round Kalyna-b/2b" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information, vol. E99-D, no. 4, pp. 1246-1250, April 2016, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2015EDL8174.
Abstract: In this letter, we present a meet-in-the-middle attack on the 7-round reduced block cipher Kalyna-b/2b, which has been approved as the new encryption standard of Ukraine (DSTU 7624:2014) in 2015. According to its designers, the cipher provides strength to several cryptanalytic methods after the fifth and sixth rounds of the versions with block length of 128 and 256 bits, respectively. Our attack is based on the differential enumeration approach, where we carefully deploy a four-round distinguisher in the first four rounds to bypass the effect of the carry bits resulting from the prewhitening modular key addition. We also exploit the linear relation between consecutive odd and even indexed round keys, which enables us to attack seven rounds and recover all the round keys incrementally. The attack on Kalyna with 128-bit block has a data complexity of 2⁸⁹ chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2^230.2 and a memory complexity of 2^202.64. The data, time and memory complexities of our attack on Kalyna with 256-bit block are 2²³³, 2^502.2 and 2¹⁷⁰, respectively.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2015EDL8174/_p

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@ARTICLE{e99-d_4_1246,
author={Riham ALTAWY, Ahmed ABDELKHALEK, Amr M. YOUSSEF, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={A Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on Reduced-Round Kalyna-b/2b},
year={2016},
volume={E99-D},
number={4},
pages={1246-1250},
abstract={In this letter, we present a meet-in-the-middle attack on the 7-round reduced block cipher Kalyna-b/2b, which has been approved as the new encryption standard of Ukraine (DSTU 7624:2014) in 2015. According to its designers, the cipher provides strength to several cryptanalytic methods after the fifth and sixth rounds of the versions with block length of 128 and 256 bits, respectively. Our attack is based on the differential enumeration approach, where we carefully deploy a four-round distinguisher in the first four rounds to bypass the effect of the carry bits resulting from the prewhitening modular key addition. We also exploit the linear relation between consecutive odd and even indexed round keys, which enables us to attack seven rounds and recover all the round keys incrementally. The attack on Kalyna with 128-bit block has a data complexity of 2⁸⁹ chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2^230.2 and a memory complexity of 2^202.64. The data, time and memory complexities of our attack on Kalyna with 256-bit block are 2²³³, 2^502.2 and 2¹⁷⁰, respectively.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.2015EDL8174},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={April},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - A Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on Reduced-Round Kalyna-b/2b
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 1246
EP - 1250
AU - Riham ALTAWY
AU - Ahmed ABDELKHALEK
AU - Amr M. YOUSSEF
PY - 2016
DO - 10.1587/transinf.2015EDL8174
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E99-D
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - April 2016
AB - In this letter, we present a meet-in-the-middle attack on the 7-round reduced block cipher Kalyna-b/2b, which has been approved as the new encryption standard of Ukraine (DSTU 7624:2014) in 2015. According to its designers, the cipher provides strength to several cryptanalytic methods after the fifth and sixth rounds of the versions with block length of 128 and 256 bits, respectively. Our attack is based on the differential enumeration approach, where we carefully deploy a four-round distinguisher in the first four rounds to bypass the effect of the carry bits resulting from the prewhitening modular key addition. We also exploit the linear relation between consecutive odd and even indexed round keys, which enables us to attack seven rounds and recover all the round keys incrementally. The attack on Kalyna with 128-bit block has a data complexity of 2⁸⁹ chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2^230.2 and a memory complexity of 2^202.64. The data, time and memory complexities of our attack on Kalyna with 256-bit block are 2²³³, 2^502.2 and 2¹⁷⁰, respectively.
ER -