Using Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata to Attack the Shrinking Generator

Pino CABALLERO-GIL; Amparo FUSTER-SABATER

doi:10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.5.1166

Using Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata to Attack the Shrinking Generator

Pino CABALLERO-GIL, Amparo FUSTER-SABATER

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The aim of this research is the efficient cryptanalysis of the Shrinking Generator through its characterization by means of Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata. This paper describes a new known-plaintext attack based on the computation of the characteristic polynomials of sub-automata and on the generation of the Galois field associated to one of the Linear Feedback Shift Registers components of the generator. The proposed algorithm allows predicting with absolute certainty, many unseen bits of the keystream sequence, thanks to the knowledge of both registers lengths, the characteristic polynomial of one of the registers, and the interception of a variable number of keystream bits.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E89-A No.5 pp.1166-1172

Publication Date: 2006/05/01

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Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.5.1166

Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)

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Pino CABALLERO-GIL, Amparo FUSTER-SABATER, "Using Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata to Attack the Shrinking Generator" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E89-A, no. 5, pp. 1166-1172, May 2006, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.5.1166.
Abstract: The aim of this research is the efficient cryptanalysis of the Shrinking Generator through its characterization by means of Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata. This paper describes a new known-plaintext attack based on the computation of the characteristic polynomials of sub-automata and on the generation of the Galois field associated to one of the Linear Feedback Shift Registers components of the generator. The proposed algorithm allows predicting with absolute certainty, many unseen bits of the keystream sequence, thanks to the knowledge of both registers lengths, the characteristic polynomial of one of the registers, and the interception of a variable number of keystream bits.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.5.1166/_p

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@ARTICLE{e89-a_5_1166,
author={Pino CABALLERO-GIL, Amparo FUSTER-SABATER, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Using Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata to Attack the Shrinking Generator},
year={2006},
volume={E89-A},
number={5},
pages={1166-1172},
abstract={The aim of this research is the efficient cryptanalysis of the Shrinking Generator through its characterization by means of Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata. This paper describes a new known-plaintext attack based on the computation of the characteristic polynomials of sub-automata and on the generation of the Galois field associated to one of the Linear Feedback Shift Registers components of the generator. The proposed algorithm allows predicting with absolute certainty, many unseen bits of the keystream sequence, thanks to the knowledge of both registers lengths, the characteristic polynomial of one of the registers, and the interception of a variable number of keystream bits.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.5.1166},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={May},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Using Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata to Attack the Shrinking Generator
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 1166
EP - 1172
AU - Pino CABALLERO-GIL
AU - Amparo FUSTER-SABATER
PY - 2006
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.5.1166
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E89-A
IS - 5
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - May 2006
AB - The aim of this research is the efficient cryptanalysis of the Shrinking Generator through its characterization by means of Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata. This paper describes a new known-plaintext attack based on the computation of the characteristic polynomials of sub-automata and on the generation of the Galois field associated to one of the Linear Feedback Shift Registers components of the generator. The proposed algorithm allows predicting with absolute certainty, many unseen bits of the keystream sequence, thanks to the knowledge of both registers lengths, the characteristic polynomial of one of the registers, and the interception of a variable number of keystream bits.
ER -