Provably Secure Untraceable Electronic Cash against Insider Attacks

Yoshikazu HANATANI; Yuichi KOMANO; Kazuo OHTA; Noboru KUNIHIRO

doi:10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.5.980

Provably Secure Untraceable Electronic Cash against Insider Attacks

Yoshikazu HANATANI, Yuichi KOMANO, Kazuo OHTA, Noboru KUNIHIRO

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Although a great deal of research has been done on electronic cash schemes with blind multisignatures to prevent an insider attack, there is no discussion of a formal security model in the literature. Firstly we discussed the security model of e-cash schemes based on the blind multisignature scheme against a (restricted) attack model and proposed a concrete scheme proven to be secure in the model [1]; however, this attack model disallows an attacker from corrupting an issuing bank and shops in the forgery game. In this paper, first, we reconsider the security model to remove the restriction of the attack model. Second, we propose a new untraceable e-cash scheme with a blind multisignature scheme and prove that the proposed scheme is secure against the (non-restricted) attacks under the DDH assumption in the random oracle model.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E90-A No.5 pp.980-991

Publication Date: 2007/05/01

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Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.5.980

Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)

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Yoshikazu HANATANI, Yuichi KOMANO, Kazuo OHTA, Noboru KUNIHIRO, "Provably Secure Untraceable Electronic Cash against Insider Attacks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E90-A, no. 5, pp. 980-991, May 2007, doi: 10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.5.980.
Abstract: Although a great deal of research has been done on electronic cash schemes with blind multisignatures to prevent an insider attack, there is no discussion of a formal security model in the literature. Firstly we discussed the security model of e-cash schemes based on the blind multisignature scheme against a (restricted) attack model and proposed a concrete scheme proven to be secure in the model [1]; however, this attack model disallows an attacker from corrupting an issuing bank and shops in the forgery game. In this paper, first, we reconsider the security model to remove the restriction of the attack model. Second, we propose a new untraceable e-cash scheme with a blind multisignature scheme and prove that the proposed scheme is secure against the (non-restricted) attacks under the DDH assumption in the random oracle model.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.5.980/_p

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@ARTICLE{e90-a_5_980,
author={Yoshikazu HANATANI, Yuichi KOMANO, Kazuo OHTA, Noboru KUNIHIRO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Provably Secure Untraceable Electronic Cash against Insider Attacks},
year={2007},
volume={E90-A},
number={5},
pages={980-991},
abstract={Although a great deal of research has been done on electronic cash schemes with blind multisignatures to prevent an insider attack, there is no discussion of a formal security model in the literature. Firstly we discussed the security model of e-cash schemes based on the blind multisignature scheme against a (restricted) attack model and proposed a concrete scheme proven to be secure in the model [1]; however, this attack model disallows an attacker from corrupting an issuing bank and shops in the forgery game. In this paper, first, we reconsider the security model to remove the restriction of the attack model. Second, we propose a new untraceable e-cash scheme with a blind multisignature scheme and prove that the proposed scheme is secure against the (non-restricted) attacks under the DDH assumption in the random oracle model.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.5.980},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={May},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Provably Secure Untraceable Electronic Cash against Insider Attacks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 980
EP - 991
AU - Yoshikazu HANATANI
AU - Yuichi KOMANO
AU - Kazuo OHTA
AU - Noboru KUNIHIRO
PY - 2007
DO - 10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.5.980
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E90-A
IS - 5
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - May 2007
AB - Although a great deal of research has been done on electronic cash schemes with blind multisignatures to prevent an insider attack, there is no discussion of a formal security model in the literature. Firstly we discussed the security model of e-cash schemes based on the blind multisignature scheme against a (restricted) attack model and proposed a concrete scheme proven to be secure in the model [1]; however, this attack model disallows an attacker from corrupting an issuing bank and shops in the forgery game. In this paper, first, we reconsider the security model to remove the restriction of the attack model. Second, we propose a new untraceable e-cash scheme with a blind multisignature scheme and prove that the proposed scheme is secure against the (non-restricted) attacks under the DDH assumption in the random oracle model.
ER -