Impossible Differential Attack against 14-Round <I>Piccolo</I>-80 without Relying on Full Code Book

Yosuke TODO

doi:10.1587/transfun.E99.A.154

Impossible Differential Attack against 14-Round Piccolo-80 without Relying on Full Code Book

Yosuke TODO

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Piccolo is a lightweight block cipher proposed by Sony Corporation in 2011. The designers showed two key modes, Piccolo-80 and Piccolo-128, which use an 80-bit secret key and a 128-bit one, respectively. Isobe and Shibutani estimated the security of Piccolo-80, and they showed that 14-round (reduced) Piccolo-80 w/o whitening keys is vulnerable against the Meet-in-the-Middle attack. The time complexity of their attack is about 2⁷³, but unfortunately it requires 2⁶⁴ texts, namely, the full code book. In this paper, we propose a new impossible differential attack against 14-round Piccolo-80 w/o whitening keys, and it can recover the secret key without relying on the full code book. The time complexity is 2⁶⁸ and it uses 2^62.2 distinct know plaintexts.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals Vol.E99-A No.1 pp.154-157

Publication Date: 2016/01/01

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Online ISSN: 1745-1337

DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E99.A.154

Type of Manuscript: Special Section LETTER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)

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Yosuke TODO
NTT Corporation

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impossible differential attack, Piccolo-80

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Yosuke TODO, "Impossible Differential Attack against 14-Round Piccolo-80 without Relying on Full Code Book" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals, vol. E99-A, no. 1, pp. 154-157, January 2016, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E99.A.154.
Abstract: Piccolo is a lightweight block cipher proposed by Sony Corporation in 2011. The designers showed two key modes, Piccolo-80 and Piccolo-128, which use an 80-bit secret key and a 128-bit one, respectively. Isobe and Shibutani estimated the security of Piccolo-80, and they showed that 14-round (reduced) Piccolo-80 w/o whitening keys is vulnerable against the Meet-in-the-Middle attack. The time complexity of their attack is about 2⁷³, but unfortunately it requires 2⁶⁴ texts, namely, the full code book. In this paper, we propose a new impossible differential attack against 14-round Piccolo-80 w/o whitening keys, and it can recover the secret key without relying on the full code book. The time complexity is 2⁶⁸ and it uses 2^62.2 distinct know plaintexts.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E99.A.154/_p

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@ARTICLE{e99-a_1_154,
author={Yosuke TODO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Impossible Differential Attack against 14-Round Piccolo-80 without Relying on Full Code Book},
year={2016},
volume={E99-A},
number={1},
pages={154-157},
abstract={Piccolo is a lightweight block cipher proposed by Sony Corporation in 2011. The designers showed two key modes, Piccolo-80 and Piccolo-128, which use an 80-bit secret key and a 128-bit one, respectively. Isobe and Shibutani estimated the security of Piccolo-80, and they showed that 14-round (reduced) Piccolo-80 w/o whitening keys is vulnerable against the Meet-in-the-Middle attack. The time complexity of their attack is about 2⁷³, but unfortunately it requires 2⁶⁴ texts, namely, the full code book. In this paper, we propose a new impossible differential attack against 14-round Piccolo-80 w/o whitening keys, and it can recover the secret key without relying on the full code book. The time complexity is 2⁶⁸ and it uses 2^62.2 distinct know plaintexts.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E99.A.154},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Impossible Differential Attack against 14-Round Piccolo-80 without Relying on Full Code Book
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 154
EP - 157
AU - Yosuke TODO
PY - 2016
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E99.A.154
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E99-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2016
AB - Piccolo is a lightweight block cipher proposed by Sony Corporation in 2011. The designers showed two key modes, Piccolo-80 and Piccolo-128, which use an 80-bit secret key and a 128-bit one, respectively. Isobe and Shibutani estimated the security of Piccolo-80, and they showed that 14-round (reduced) Piccolo-80 w/o whitening keys is vulnerable against the Meet-in-the-Middle attack. The time complexity of their attack is about 2⁷³, but unfortunately it requires 2⁶⁴ texts, namely, the full code book. In this paper, we propose a new impossible differential attack against 14-round Piccolo-80 w/o whitening keys, and it can recover the secret key without relying on the full code book. The time complexity is 2⁶⁸ and it uses 2^62.2 distinct know plaintexts.
ER -