An Electronic Voting Protocol Preserving Voter's Privacy

Hiroshi YAMAGUCHI; Atsushi KITAZAWA; Hiroshi DOI; Kaoru KUROSAWA; Shigeo TSUJII

An Electronic Voting Protocol Preserving Voter's Privacy

Hiroshi YAMAGUCHI, Atsushi KITAZAWA, Hiroshi DOI, Kaoru KUROSAWA, Shigeo TSUJII

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In this paper we present a new, two-centered electronic voting scheme that is capable of preserving privacy, universal verifiability, and robustness. An interesting property of our scheme is the use of double encryption with additive homomorphic encryption functions. In the two-centered scheme, the first center decrypts the ballots, checks the eligibility of the voters, and multiplies each eligible vote, which is still encrypted in the cryptosystem of the second center. After the deadline is reached, the second center obtains the final tally by decrypting the accumulated votes. As such, both centers cannot know the content of any individual vote, as each vote is hidden in the accumulated result, therefore the privacy of the voters is preserved. Our protocols, together with some existing protocols, allow everyone to verify that all valid votes are correctly counted. We apply the r-th residue cryptosystem as the homomorphic encryption function. Although decryption in the r-th residue cryptosystem requires an exhaustive search for all possible values, based on experiments we show that it is possible to achieve desirable performance for large-scale elections.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E86-D No.9 pp.1868-1878

Publication Date: 2003/09/01

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Type of Manuscript: PAPER

Category: Applications of Information Security Techniques

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Hiroshi YAMAGUCHI, Atsushi KITAZAWA, Hiroshi DOI, Kaoru KUROSAWA, Shigeo TSUJII, "An Electronic Voting Protocol Preserving Voter's Privacy" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information, vol. E86-D, no. 9, pp. 1868-1878, September 2003, doi: .
Abstract: In this paper we present a new, two-centered electronic voting scheme that is capable of preserving privacy, universal verifiability, and robustness. An interesting property of our scheme is the use of double encryption with additive homomorphic encryption functions. In the two-centered scheme, the first center decrypts the ballots, checks the eligibility of the voters, and multiplies each eligible vote, which is still encrypted in the cryptosystem of the second center. After the deadline is reached, the second center obtains the final tally by decrypting the accumulated votes. As such, both centers cannot know the content of any individual vote, as each vote is hidden in the accumulated result, therefore the privacy of the voters is preserved. Our protocols, together with some existing protocols, allow everyone to verify that all valid votes are correctly counted. We apply the r-th residue cryptosystem as the homomorphic encryption function. Although decryption in the r-th residue cryptosystem requires an exhaustive search for all possible values, based on experiments we show that it is possible to achieve desirable performance for large-scale elections.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/e86-d_9_1868/_p

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@ARTICLE{e86-d_9_1868,
author={Hiroshi YAMAGUCHI, Atsushi KITAZAWA, Hiroshi DOI, Kaoru KUROSAWA, Shigeo TSUJII, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={An Electronic Voting Protocol Preserving Voter's Privacy},
year={2003},
volume={E86-D},
number={9},
pages={1868-1878},
abstract={In this paper we present a new, two-centered electronic voting scheme that is capable of preserving privacy, universal verifiability, and robustness. An interesting property of our scheme is the use of double encryption with additive homomorphic encryption functions. In the two-centered scheme, the first center decrypts the ballots, checks the eligibility of the voters, and multiplies each eligible vote, which is still encrypted in the cryptosystem of the second center. After the deadline is reached, the second center obtains the final tally by decrypting the accumulated votes. As such, both centers cannot know the content of any individual vote, as each vote is hidden in the accumulated result, therefore the privacy of the voters is preserved. Our protocols, together with some existing protocols, allow everyone to verify that all valid votes are correctly counted. We apply the r-th residue cryptosystem as the homomorphic encryption function. Although decryption in the r-th residue cryptosystem requires an exhaustive search for all possible values, based on experiments we show that it is possible to achieve desirable performance for large-scale elections.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={September},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - An Electronic Voting Protocol Preserving Voter's Privacy
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 1868
EP - 1878
AU - Hiroshi YAMAGUCHI
AU - Atsushi KITAZAWA
AU - Hiroshi DOI
AU - Kaoru KUROSAWA
AU - Shigeo TSUJII
PY - 2003
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN -
VL - E86-D
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - September 2003
AB - In this paper we present a new, two-centered electronic voting scheme that is capable of preserving privacy, universal verifiability, and robustness. An interesting property of our scheme is the use of double encryption with additive homomorphic encryption functions. In the two-centered scheme, the first center decrypts the ballots, checks the eligibility of the voters, and multiplies each eligible vote, which is still encrypted in the cryptosystem of the second center. After the deadline is reached, the second center obtains the final tally by decrypting the accumulated votes. As such, both centers cannot know the content of any individual vote, as each vote is hidden in the accumulated result, therefore the privacy of the voters is preserved. Our protocols, together with some existing protocols, allow everyone to verify that all valid votes are correctly counted. We apply the r-th residue cryptosystem as the homomorphic encryption function. Although decryption in the r-th residue cryptosystem requires an exhaustive search for all possible values, based on experiments we show that it is possible to achieve desirable performance for large-scale elections.
ER -