Key infection is a lightweight key-distribution protocol for partially compromised wireless sensor networks, where sensor nodes send cryptographic keys in the clear. As the adversary is assumed to be present partially at the deployment stage, some keys are eavesdropped but others remain secret. To enhance the security of key infection, secrecy amplification combines keys propagated along different paths. Two neighbor nodes W1 and W2 can use another node W3 to update their key. If W3 is outside of the eavesdropping region of the adversary, the updated key is guaranteed to be secure. To date, the effectiveness of secrecy amplification has been demonstrated only by simulation. In this article, we present the first mathematical analysis of secrecy amplification. Our result shows that the effectiveness of secrecy amplification increases as the distance between the two neighbor nodes decreases.
Dae Hyun YUM
Myongji University
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Dae Hyun YUM, "Mathematical Analysis of Secrecy Amplification in Key Infection" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E99-D, no. 9, pp. 2390-2394, September 2016, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2016EDL8001.
Abstract: Key infection is a lightweight key-distribution protocol for partially compromised wireless sensor networks, where sensor nodes send cryptographic keys in the clear. As the adversary is assumed to be present partially at the deployment stage, some keys are eavesdropped but others remain secret. To enhance the security of key infection, secrecy amplification combines keys propagated along different paths. Two neighbor nodes W1 and W2 can use another node W3 to update their key. If W3 is outside of the eavesdropping region of the adversary, the updated key is guaranteed to be secure. To date, the effectiveness of secrecy amplification has been demonstrated only by simulation. In this article, we present the first mathematical analysis of secrecy amplification. Our result shows that the effectiveness of secrecy amplification increases as the distance between the two neighbor nodes decreases.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2016EDL8001/_p
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@ARTICLE{e99-d_9_2390,
author={Dae Hyun YUM, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Mathematical Analysis of Secrecy Amplification in Key Infection},
year={2016},
volume={E99-D},
number={9},
pages={2390-2394},
abstract={Key infection is a lightweight key-distribution protocol for partially compromised wireless sensor networks, where sensor nodes send cryptographic keys in the clear. As the adversary is assumed to be present partially at the deployment stage, some keys are eavesdropped but others remain secret. To enhance the security of key infection, secrecy amplification combines keys propagated along different paths. Two neighbor nodes W1 and W2 can use another node W3 to update their key. If W3 is outside of the eavesdropping region of the adversary, the updated key is guaranteed to be secure. To date, the effectiveness of secrecy amplification has been demonstrated only by simulation. In this article, we present the first mathematical analysis of secrecy amplification. Our result shows that the effectiveness of secrecy amplification increases as the distance between the two neighbor nodes decreases.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.2016EDL8001},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={September},}
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TY - JOUR
TI - Mathematical Analysis of Secrecy Amplification in Key Infection
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 2390
EP - 2394
AU - Dae Hyun YUM
PY - 2016
DO - 10.1587/transinf.2016EDL8001
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E99-D
IS - 9
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - September 2016
AB - Key infection is a lightweight key-distribution protocol for partially compromised wireless sensor networks, where sensor nodes send cryptographic keys in the clear. As the adversary is assumed to be present partially at the deployment stage, some keys are eavesdropped but others remain secret. To enhance the security of key infection, secrecy amplification combines keys propagated along different paths. Two neighbor nodes W1 and W2 can use another node W3 to update their key. If W3 is outside of the eavesdropping region of the adversary, the updated key is guaranteed to be secure. To date, the effectiveness of secrecy amplification has been demonstrated only by simulation. In this article, we present the first mathematical analysis of secrecy amplification. Our result shows that the effectiveness of secrecy amplification increases as the distance between the two neighbor nodes decreases.
ER -