Threshold Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Insider Attacks

SeongHan SHIN; Kazukuni KOBARA; Hideki IMAI

doi:10.1587/transinf.E94.D.2095

Threshold Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Insider Attacks

SeongHan SHIN, Kazukuni KOBARA, Hideki IMAI

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An anonymous password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol is designed to provide both password-only authentication and client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. In INDOCRYPT2008, Yang and Zhang [26] proposed a new anonymous PAKE (NAPAKE) protocol and its threshold (D-NAPAKE) which they claimed to be secure against insider attacks. In this paper, we first show that the D-NAPAKE protocol [26] is completely insecure against insider attacks unlike their claim. Specifically, only one legitimate client can freely impersonate any subgroup of clients (the threshold t > 1) to the server. After giving a security model that captures insider attacks, we propose a threshold anonymous PAKE (called, TAP⁺) protocol which provides security against insider attacks. Moreover, we prove that the TAP⁺ protocol has semantic security of session keys against active attacks as well as insider attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and provides client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. Finally, several discussions are followed: 1) We also show another threshold anonymous PAKE protocol by applying our RATIONALE to the non-threshold anonymous PAKE (VEAP) protocol [23]; and 2) We give the efficiency comparison, security consideration and implementation issue of the TAP⁺ protocol.

Publication: IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information Vol.E94-D No.11 pp.2095-2110

Publication Date: 2011/11/01

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Online ISSN: 1745-1361

DOI: 10.1587/transinf.E94.D.2095

Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Information and Communication System Security)

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SeongHan SHIN, Kazukuni KOBARA, Hideki IMAI, "Threshold Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Insider Attacks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information, vol. E94-D, no. 11, pp. 2095-2110, November 2011, doi: 10.1587/transinf.E94.D.2095.
Abstract: An anonymous password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol is designed to provide both password-only authentication and client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. In INDOCRYPT2008, Yang and Zhang [26] proposed a new anonymous PAKE (NAPAKE) protocol and its threshold (D-NAPAKE) which they claimed to be secure against insider attacks. In this paper, we first show that the D-NAPAKE protocol [26] is completely insecure against insider attacks unlike their claim. Specifically, only one legitimate client can freely impersonate any subgroup of clients (the threshold t > 1) to the server. After giving a security model that captures insider attacks, we propose a threshold anonymous PAKE (called, TAP⁺) protocol which provides security against insider attacks. Moreover, we prove that the TAP⁺ protocol has semantic security of session keys against active attacks as well as insider attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and provides client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. Finally, several discussions are followed: 1) We also show another threshold anonymous PAKE protocol by applying our RATIONALE to the non-threshold anonymous PAKE (VEAP) protocol [23]; and 2) We give the efficiency comparison, security consideration and implementation issue of the TAP⁺ protocol.
URL: https://globals.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.E94.D.2095/_p

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@ARTICLE{e94-d_11_2095,
author={SeongHan SHIN, Kazukuni KOBARA, Hideki IMAI, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Threshold Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Insider Attacks},
year={2011},
volume={E94-D},
number={11},
pages={2095-2110},
abstract={An anonymous password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol is designed to provide both password-only authentication and client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. In INDOCRYPT2008, Yang and Zhang [26] proposed a new anonymous PAKE (NAPAKE) protocol and its threshold (D-NAPAKE) which they claimed to be secure against insider attacks. In this paper, we first show that the D-NAPAKE protocol [26] is completely insecure against insider attacks unlike their claim. Specifically, only one legitimate client can freely impersonate any subgroup of clients (the threshold t > 1) to the server. After giving a security model that captures insider attacks, we propose a threshold anonymous PAKE (called, TAP⁺) protocol which provides security against insider attacks. Moreover, we prove that the TAP⁺ protocol has semantic security of session keys against active attacks as well as insider attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and provides client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. Finally, several discussions are followed: 1) We also show another threshold anonymous PAKE protocol by applying our RATIONALE to the non-threshold anonymous PAKE (VEAP) protocol [23]; and 2) We give the efficiency comparison, security consideration and implementation issue of the TAP⁺ protocol.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.E94.D.2095},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={November},}

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TY - JOUR
TI - Threshold Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Insider Attacks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 2095
EP - 2110
AU - SeongHan SHIN
AU - Kazukuni KOBARA
AU - Hideki IMAI
PY - 2011
DO - 10.1587/transinf.E94.D.2095
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E94-D
IS - 11
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - November 2011
AB - An anonymous password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol is designed to provide both password-only authentication and client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. In INDOCRYPT2008, Yang and Zhang [26] proposed a new anonymous PAKE (NAPAKE) protocol and its threshold (D-NAPAKE) which they claimed to be secure against insider attacks. In this paper, we first show that the D-NAPAKE protocol [26] is completely insecure against insider attacks unlike their claim. Specifically, only one legitimate client can freely impersonate any subgroup of clients (the threshold t > 1) to the server. After giving a security model that captures insider attacks, we propose a threshold anonymous PAKE (called, TAP⁺) protocol which provides security against insider attacks. Moreover, we prove that the TAP⁺ protocol has semantic security of session keys against active attacks as well as insider attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and provides client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol. Finally, several discussions are followed: 1) We also show another threshold anonymous PAKE protocol by applying our RATIONALE to the non-threshold anonymous PAKE (VEAP) protocol [23]; and 2) We give the efficiency comparison, security consideration and implementation issue of the TAP⁺ protocol.
ER -