Author Search Result

[Author] Yuli ZHANG(2hit)

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  • Design Approach and Implementation of Application Specific Instruction Set Processor for SHA-3 BLAKE Algorithm

    Yuli ZHANG  Jun HAN  Xinqian WENG  Zhongzhu HE  Xiaoyang ZENG  

     
    PAPER-Electronic Circuits

      Vol:
    E95-C No:8
      Page(s):
    1415-1426

    This paper presents an Application Specific Instruction-set Processor (ASIP) for the SHA-3 BLAKE algorithm family by instruction set extensions (ISE) from an RISC (reduced instruction set computer) processor. With a design space exploration for this ASIP to increase the performance and reduce the area cost, we accomplish an efficient hardware and software implementation of BLAKE algorithm. The special instructions and their well-matched hardware function unit improve the calculation of the key section of the algorithm, namely G-functions. Also, relaxing the time constraint of the special function unit can decrease its hardware cost, while keeping the high data throughput of the processor. Evaluation results reveal the ASIP achieves 335 Mbps and 176 Mbps for BLAKE-256 and BLAKE-512. The extra area cost is only 8.06k equivalent gates. The proposed ASIP outperforms several software approaches on various platforms in cycle per byte. In fact, both high throughput and low hardware cost achieved by this programmable processor are comparable to that of ASIC implementations.

  • A Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Solution to Win-Win Situation: A Presale Mechanism in Spectrum Market

    Wei BAI  Yuli ZHANG  Meng WANG  Jin CHEN  Han JIANG  Zhan GAO  Donglin JIAO  

     
    LETTER-Information Network

      Pubricized:
    2019/08/28
      Vol:
    E102-D No:12
      Page(s):
    2607-2610

    This paper investigates the spectrum allocation problem. Under the current spectrum management mode, large amount of spectrum resource is wasted due to uncertainty of user's demand. To reduce the impact of uncertainty, a presale mechanism is designed based on spectrum pool. In this mechanism, the spectrum manager provides spectrum resource at a favorable price for presale aiming at sharing with user the risk caused by uncertainty of demand. Because of the hierarchical characteristic, we build a spectrum market Stackelberg game, in which the manager acts as leader and user as follower. Then proof of the uniqueness and optimality of Stackelberg Equilibrium is given. Simulation results show the presale mechanism can promote profits for both sides and reduce temporary scheduling.

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