It is important to reduce the power consumption of complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) logic circuits, especially those used in mobile devices. A CMOS logic circuit consists of metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs), which consume electrical power dynamically when they charge and discharge load capacitance that is connected to their output. Load capacitance mainly exists in wiring or buses, and transitions between logic 0 and logic 1 cause these charges and discharges. Many methods have been proposed to reduce these transitions. One novel method (called segmentation coding) has recently been proposed that reduces power consumption of CMOS buses carrying band-limited signals, such as audio data. It improves performance by employing dedicated encoders for the upper and lower bits of transmitted data, in which the transition characteristics of band-limited signals are utilized. However, it uses a conventional majority voting circuit in the encoder for lower bits, and the circuit uses many adders to count the number of 1s to calculate the Hamming distance between the transmitted data. This paper proposes segmentation coding with pseudo-majority voting. The proposed pseudo-majority voting circuit counts the number of 1s with fewer circuit resources than the conventional circuit by further utilizing the transition characteristics of band-limited signals. The effectiveness of the proposed method was demonstrated through computer simulations and experiments.

In this paper, the measurement of capacitance variation, of an on-chip power distribution network (PDN) due to the change of internal states of a CMOS logic circuit, is studied. A state-dependent PDN-capacitance model that explains measurement results will be also proposed. The model is composed of capacitance elements related to MOS transistors, signal and power supply wires, and substrate. Reflecting the changes of electrode potentials, the capacitance elements become state-dependent. The capacitive elements are then all connected in parallel between power supply and ground to form the proposed model. By using the proposed model, state-dependence of PDN-capacitances for different logic circuits are studied in detail. The change of PDN-capacitance exceeds 12% of its total capacitance in some cases, which corresponds to 6% shift of anti-resonance frequency. Consideration of the state-dependence is important for modeling the PDN-capacitance.

A design methodology of Random Switching Logic (RSL) using CMOS standard cell libraries is proposed to counter power analysis attacks against cryptographic hardware modules. The original RSL proposed in 2004 requires a unique RSL-gate for random data masking and glitch suppression to prevent secret information leakage through power traces. In contrast, our new methodology enables to use general logic gates supported by standard cell libraries. In order to evaluate its practical performance in hardware size and speed as well as resistance against power analysis attacks, an AES circuit with the RSL technique was implemented as a cryptographic LSI using 130-nm and 90-nm CMOS standard cell library. From the results of attack experiments that used a million traces, we confirmed that the RSL-AES circuit has very high DPA and CPA resistance thanks to the contributions of both the masking function and the glitch suppressing function.

In recent years, certain countermeasures against differential power analysis (DPA) at the logic level have been proposed. Recently, Popp and Mangard proposed a new countermeasure-masked dual-rail pre-charge logic (MDPL); this countermeasure combines dual-rail circuits with random masking to improve the wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL). They claimed that it could implement secure circuits using a standard CMOS cell library without special constraints for the place-and-route method because the difference between the loading capacitances of all the pairs of complementary logic gates in MDPL can be compensated for by the random masking. In this paper, we particularly focus on the signal transition of MDPL gates and evaluate the DPA-resistance of MDPL in detail. Our evaluation results reveal that when the input signals have different delay times, leakage occurs in the MDPL as well as WDDL gates, even if MDPL is effective in reducing the leakage caused by the difference in loading capacitances. Furthermore, in order to validate our evaluation, we demonstrate a problem with different input signal delays by conducting measurements for an FPGA.

This paper proposes a new countermeasure, Random Switching Logic (RSL), against DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and Second-Order DPA at the logic level. RSL makes a signal transition uniform at each gate and suppresses the propagation of glitch to allow power consumption to be independent of predictable data. Furthermore, we implement basic logic circuits on the FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) by using RSL, and evaluate the effectiveness. As a result, we confirm the fact that the secure circuit can be structured against DPA and Second-Order DPA.

In this paper, we propose new models for directly evaluating DPA leakage from logic information in CMOS circuits. These models are based on the transition probability for each gate, and are naturally applicable to various actual devices for simulating power analysis. Furthermore, we demonstrate the weakness of previously known hardware countermeasures for both our model and FPGA and suggest secure conditions for the hardware countermeasure.